Bridge analysis goes in a circle

David Bragdon, Metro president (left), and City Commissioner Randy Leonard both want the Interstate 5 bridge discussion to focus on the facts, but each has a different emphasis.

Yes, everyone should focus on the facts, but
they may be slippier than The Oregonian suggested

I appreciate The Oregonian's editorial board focusing on the rational analysis about the Interstate 5 bridge. It's right to dismiss the loudest critics, whose arguments are largely emotional and who are simply trying to kill the project.

But in dismissing that extreme, you have overlooked thoughtful and constructive questions from rational people who are supportive of the project but who -- with good reasons -- view the ODOT/
WashDOT projections with caution, especially in regard to size.

We want this project built, and we want it built in a manner that serves its purpose rather than defeats its purpose.

The way in which these projects have a history of defeating their purpose is when they attract more traffic than expected and create more congestion, rather than solving it. I am well aware the modelers claim that won't happen in this case, but you need to look at the model and the modelers before accepting that assertion.

The key concept to consider is what economists call "induced demand." Transportation infrastructure is one of the few categories of capital investment in which the supply curve (capacity) can actually influence the demand curve (traffic).

For most other forms of infrastructure, the supply curve does not have that interactive effect on demand; if we build more schools, people do not have more children; if we build more sewers, people do not flush the toilet more.

But unless other factors are introduced to influence demand, if we build more road capacity, history has shown people will drive more. That factor is why Susan Nielsen's metaphor in her recent column about the hypothetical family with triplets does not quite fit this exercise.

While it seems common sense to say "if demand is 'x' then build to 'x,'" experience shows that, without other controls, building to "x" causes demand to rise to "x plus." And so it goes. That, in one sentence, is the history of 20th century transportation planning in America.

There are many reasons to believe the impact of induced demand will be somewhat limited in this case: There are good land use systems in place on both sides of the river; the new bridge would replace an established one in an existing corridor rather than opening up a long new corridor; good transit will be provided where today there is very little; and some form of tolling will dampen demand.

Again, my conclusion is that there is far more upside potential in this project than downside risk. But with all due respect, the boosters (and now your editorials and columns) have downplayed the risks of a "too big" bridge and their possible costs.

When the two state DOTs (really the highway divisions) are asked about induced demand, they cite the mitigating factors above, which are valid, but they ultimately rest their case on two key statements that are unproven -- and that the two DOTs will not allow to be scrutinized independently.

(Their"peer review," conducted by traffic modelers from unenviable places like Atlanta and Dallas, was not an independent assessment of anything, but simply a confirmation of standard American terminology and methodology.)

The two underpinnings they rely on are, first, the assertion that settlement patterns will not change; and, second, that the toll will dampen demand. Neither of these two assumptions, while somewhat plausible, has been validated.

The first, that settlement patterns would not change, is an output of the model only because the two DOTs insisted it be an input. They created a tautology rather than any illumination. The second, that tolls will dampen demand, is valid as a general assertion but has not been subjected to rigorous analysis on the obvious question of "how much": How much does it dampen demand, and how does pricing relate to the question of physical capacity?

Nor has any agreement on tolling been reached, or assurance that political pressure will not reduce the tolls. It's very curious to me, and leads me to question to motivation of the DOTs, that they have deliberately segregated two questions that are inextricably linked, capacity and pricing, and insisted that we make decisions about those two things in isolation from each other.

Your Saturday editorial referred to facts. With regard to events in the future, the "facts" have not happened yet, so we have no facts. We have projections, as well as our experience. As the head of an organization that does a lot of projections, I know that projections are only as good as the assumptions underlying them.

The fact that the two highway divisions are so defensive about their two key assumptions, and will not tolerate any independent scrutiny of them, should make inquiring minds want to investigate more.

I hope that you will persist in resisting the biases of not only the dogmatic detractors but also the uncritical boosters, and help us find the best rational answers for the region so that we not only build a project, but build a good project.

David Bragdon is Metro president.

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