China or the US-led Quad? Why India must pick a side
- The Quad’s investment in India’s vaccine manufacturing capacity shows the grouping could be a long-term partner in solving the country’s developmental challenges
- But New Delhi’s multi-alignment strategy might undermine the Quad’s willingness to invest in India
Yet, the Quad is a very significant departure from the established norms of Indian foreign policy. This is the only arena where India sits with the US and some of its closest allies, in a context clearly driven by sensitive geopolitics.
The key strategic objective of this initiative is driven by competition with China: the Quad hopes India will help counter China’s vaccine supply and influence, especially in Asia.
The Quad, therefore, is a violation of India’s philosophy of staying out of geopolitical rivalries in order to steer clear of alliances with competing parties which could restrict New Delhi’s strategic autonomy.
New Delhi seems to be conscious of this, so it is now moving from a posture of non-alignment to what academics call multi-alignment – by striking up multiple partnerships on both sides of the table. India has started to balance its engagement with the Quad by reaching out to its own key rivals, China and Pakistan.
It also signified that it is willing to do much more than just de-escalate tensions: it agreed to hold an anti-terror exercise with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which includes both China and Pakistan.
For its part, China, too, would not be opposed to any understanding that encourages India to move away from America’s influence, especially as tensions continue to rise between Beijing and the new Biden administration in Washington.
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But there is a limit to how much trust an emerging power can build by being part of competing blocs. Forging partnerships with geopolitical competitors intuitively sounds like a good thing. But it also hurts the credibility of that country in both camps.
At best, the country is no more influential than a bystander in a street fight; at worst, it is seen by both sides as an unreliable partner – a risk of sabotage. India is too large a country to step in the middle of a geopolitical see-saw without making either side wary of its presence.
New Delhi will also need to make hard decisions based on its own interests and those of other partners. Meaningful collaboration and trust-building is harder without strong common interests. Despite the factors that are currently permitting a thaw in relations, India still has fundamental problems with both Pakistan and China that are unlikely to stay swept under the carpet for long.
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The Quad, on the other hand, provides India with significant incentives to build its national power and domestic capabilities. The effort to boost India’s vaccine manufacturing capacity shows that the Quad can be moulded into a willing long-term partner in solving India’s developmental challenges.
Its key interest in doing so would be to prop India up as a counterweight to China in the Asia-Pacific. But India’s heightened engagement with rival blocs, such as the SCO, could undermine the Quad’s willingness to invest in the country.
India might not be able to sustain its multi-alignment strategy for long. Its interest in being part of competing blocs will significantly undermine its efforts to find allies and partners to invest in its own development. New Delhi should instead pursue a more sustainable strategy based on an analysis of long-term interests.
Mohamed Zeeshan is the author of Flying Blind: India’s Quest for Global Leadership (Penguin). He has previously worked at the United Nations