Infrastructure governance: a policy and discourse analysis of intergovernmental relations in two major infrastructure projects in South East Queensland (Masters Thesis)

Linda Carroli

As an investigation of infrastructure decision-making and governance, this thesis undertakes a discourse and policy analysis to investigate intergovernmental dynamics. The intention is to consider the ways in which infrastructure decision-making is embedded in narratives of urban governance so as to investigate governance practice. The research is grounded in a phronetic approach and developed through two case studies in South East Queensland urban centres: Gold Coast Rapid Transit and Brisbane BaT Tunnel. Decision and policy making in relation to major infrastructure continues to hinge on political influences and intergovernmental relations. Drawing on complexity theory, planning theory and policy analysis, intergovernmental dynamics and power relations of infrastructure decision-making, as revealed through the case studies, will be examined. This will highlight the ways in which urban infrastructure projects are negotiated among government stakeholders and how governance processes take shape. A comparative examination of the case studies reveals that governance practices involving the levels of government tend to be hierarchical and political rather than networked. This thesis is principally concerned with the interactions and relations between Federal and State government with a view to ascertaining whether deliberative and discursive relations are impacting the processes of infrastructure governance; a changing narrative of infrastructure and governance is acknowledged. There is consideration of how policy deliberation can reframe infrastructure governance as well as trigger assessment of the role of government.

Infrastructure governance: a policy and discourse analysis of intergovernmental relations in two major infrastructure projects in South East Queensland Linda Carroli Deakin University, Geelong, Australia ABSTRACT: As an investigation of infrastructure decision-making and governance, this thesis undertakes a discourse and policy analysis to investigate intergovernmental dynamics. The intention is to consider the ways in which infrastructure decision-making is embedded in narratives of urban governance so as to investigate governance practice. The research is grounded in a phronetic approach and developed through two case studies in South East Queensland urban centres: Gold Coast Rapid Transit and Brisbane BaT Tunnel. Decision and policy making in relation to major infrastructure continues to hinge on political influences and intergovernmental relations. Drawing on complexity theory, planning theory and policy analysis, intergovernmental dynamics and power relations of infrastructure decision-making, as revealed through the case studies, will be examined. This will highlight the ways in which urban infrastructure projects are negotiated among government stakeholders and how governance processes take shape. A comparative examination of the case studies reveals that governance practices involving the levels of government tend to be hierarchical and political rather than networked. This thesis is principally concerned with the interactions and relations between Federal and State government with a view to ascertaining whether deliberative and discursive relations are impacting the processes of infrastructure governance; a changing narrative of infrastructure and governance is acknowledged. There is consideration of how policy deliberation can reframe infrastructure governance as well as trigger assessment of the role of government. Keywords: infrastructure, urban governance, policy deliberation, Queensland planning 1 CONTENTS 1. 2. 3. Introduction 3 Literature review 3 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 4 4 5 Research design 5 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 5 6 6 Phronetic planning research Policy analysis Case study research Findings 7 3.1. 7 7 8 9 11 11 13 13 13 13 3.2. 4. Governance Politics, power and policy Complexity and networks Policy and governance context 3.1.1. Federal policy context 3.1.2. Queensland policy context Case studies 3.2.1. Gold Coast Rapid Transit 3.2.1.1. Project description 3.2.1.2. Intergovernmental relations 3.2.2. Brisbane BaT Tunnel 3.2.2.1. Project description 3.2.2.2. Intergovernmental relations Discussion 14 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 14 15 15 15 Framing Government and governance Changing dynamics Implications for infrastructure and urban governance Conclusion 16 Acknowledgement 17 References 17 Appendix 22 A. 22 Appendix 1: Detailed case studies 2 INTRODUCTION Australian governments have responded to varying, sometimes hyperbolic, reports of Australia’s infrastructure deficit by developing a policy focus supported by major investment and divestment programs. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has commended efforts to address the infrastructure shortfall which risks worsening due to economic, population and environmental pressures (OECD 2010:16). No single level of government can bridge the infrastructure gap, as all levels of government bear both separate and overlapping responsibilities; consequently the levels of government, as a multiplicity, must work together. Governments play a central role in decision-making and deliberation about infrastructure for productivity gains and community benefits. Infrastructure decision-making is framed rhetorically and embedded in narratives of urban governance at all territorial registers. This thesis undertakes a discourse and policy analysis of two infrastructure projects and their governance, with attention to the construction Federal-State intergovernmental dynamics through policy deliberation. As Australia’s multilevel governance involves intergovernmental arrangements to deliver infrastructure, interrogation of changing relations between governments for urban governance in an ever networked world is warranted. Urban infrastructure includes a range of structures, services and constructions in the built and natural environment, involving varied land uses and ecosystem services. It is addressed in its broadest sense and understood as “all facilities in a city that enable it to function as a system”, including ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure (Gleeson, Dong and Low 2007:310). Infrastructure includes services such as transport, water, sanitation, energy, communications and community services. Policy makes taxonomical or typological distinctions such as economic (productive) and social infrastructure – seemingly supplanting the hard/soft distinction – stressing the importance of ‘productive infrastructure’ for driving growth. Public debates about infrastructure, particularly those involving elected representatives, can appear politicised and rhetorical. In the most recent Federal and Queensland elections, infrastructure was a highly profiled issue with the then Federal Opposition Leader pledging to be an ‘Infrastructure Prime Minister’ if elected (NineMSN 2013). Cities are “extraordinary agglomerations of flows” (Ash and Thrift 2002:42); this not only means movement but other flows and mobilities, including power and governance which shape socio-technological networks and spatial decisionmaking. Governance also involves actors other than government actors; it involves the public sector, private sector and citizens. With its attention to the performativity of urban governance and policy deliberation, this study focuses on government and governance. Infrastructure governance is grounded in government, as all major infrastructure development requires government decision-making, often involving multiple levels of government. Infrastructure decision-making is only one aspect of a complex system of spatial governance which can be hampered by a focus on projects rather than spatial strategy and service systems. Albanese affirmed that infrastructure can be used to transform urban environments in ways that more incremental planning cannot. Infrastructure decision-making is a form of urban governance. While political sparring is not the subject of this thesis, there is recognition of the agonistic and contested dimensions of governance arising from policy and performativity, as well as discourse and deliberation, constitutive of infrastructure narratives. Regular calls for improved infrastructure investment, governance, decision-making and coordination emanate from diverse lobby and stakeholder groups including business, conservation, community groups and the media. Accusations of ‘pork barrelling’, ‘opaque decision-making’ and ‘white elephants’ are also sounded. However, accusations are perceptions or opinions which, as narratives, can be highly subjective in their creation and representation of the world, belying the rationality of planning and infrastructure governance. Major infrastructure decisions and budget allocations are generally a matter for State and Federal Ministers and Cabinets within the planning and policy regimes of each jurisdiction. Governance must respond to critical contextual, national and global pressures; the changeable role of government and the practice of governance can be understood in process. Yet, decision-making can remain closed, hierarchical and centralised. Intergovernmental relations and governance processes will be examined through two South East Queensland (SEQ) case studies – Gold Coast Rapid Transit (CGRT) and Brisbane BaT Tunnel – so as to analyse the discursive and performative dimensions of power relations and interrelations. 1. LITERATURE REVIEW From a policy perspective, there is ongoing questioning of the roles of government in urban governance in relation to infrastructure decision-making and complexity. Contemporary planning theory has ushered in new languages, modalities and discourse that endeavour to trace the changing dynamics of urban and infrastructure governance to both reflect and reflect on the performative relations of institutions and actants. This research is informed by an interdisciplinary theoretical approach to urban planning including complexity theory (Healey, 2007; de Roo et al. 2012), actor-consulting theory (de Roo and Porter 2007), policy analysis (Hajer 2003), and actor network theory (Latour 2005), as well as theoretical works addressing relational (Healey 2003), spatial (Hillier 2007; Albrechts 2004) and collaborative planning (Healey 1997). It is particularly attentive to the relationship between infrastructure, planning and governance (Dodson 2009; Sanyal, Vale and Rosan 2012; Healey 2010; Gleeson and Steele 2009), acknowledging shifts in political decision-making and policy making that chart a changing narrative of the role of government in infrastructure planning, including networked governance (Neal 2013; Eggers 2008) and multilevel governance (Marks and Hooghe 2004). Dodson (2009) suggests an ‘infrastructure turn’ arising from spatial restructuring that results in varying forms of urban splintering (Graham and Marvin 2001) and connection (Neal 2013) or network (Castells 1996). Urban governance, institutional arrangements and urban environments can splinter when infrastructure is extracted from spatial planning and urban policy processes to meet disparate policy 3 priorities. Infrastructure requires specific attention in relation to spatial and strategic planning in terms of ‘what is actually done’, as well as ‘what this doing does’. A focus on infrastructure can reveal weaknesses in urban governance, as addressed by Gleeson (2004), Dodson (2013), Gleeson and Steele (2009) and Graham and Marvin (2001), and suggests postdemocratic tendencies whereby the state focuses on electoral politics while withdrawing from both market intervention and broad civic interaction (Laffin, Mawson and Ormston 2013). By several accounts, Australian metropolitan governance is unique due to the nature of Federal-State-Local assemblages and the type of planning and policy work that is undertaken (Stilwell and Troy 2000; Bunker and Searle 2009). This requires sometimes fragmented and contingent decisionmaking, advocacy and implementation which are intrinsically linked to policy through the interactions of government operating in both hierarchical and networked ways. 1.1. Governance In addressing governance, Pierre argues the role of government, as an institutional actor, in governance is changing as complex and network dynamics develop (Voogd and Woltjer 2007:69-79; Neal 2013). Grindle describes governance as encompassing “the institutions, systems, ‘rules of the game,’ and other factors that determine how political and economic interactions are structured and how decisions are made and resources are allocated” (2012:261). For Kearns and Paddison, governance is “the capacity to get things done in the face of complexity, conflict and social change” (2000:847). Governance, then, can involve diverse actors and implies the need to establish rules – or relationships – in order to make decisions and act in complex and changing socio-political contexts. Further, Pierre challenges the popular idea of a ‘shift’ from government to governance and defines governance as “processes through which public and private resources are coordinated in the pursuit of collective interests” (2011:20). Stakeholders, even government itself, define the role of government in process – as they negotiate vested interests, conflicts and objectives. For Hillier (2007:11), this means governance is ‘immanent’ or incomplete, while Pierre affirms that “governance is more concerned with process” (2011:121), stressing that governance does not supplant government, but rather enables understanding of the ways in which government is socially constructed and connected. Government plays a central and potentially reflexive role in establishing governance for planning. As one party in a complex arrangement (Martens 2007:57), government occupies an equal, rather than elevated, position with others (Kickert et al. 1997:9). In calling for “more attention ... to new ways of reconsidering and actions of those involved in planning ... and to building governance capacity”, Healey (2007:21) proposes that the actions of all actors warrant ‘reconsideration’ even the role of government in governance. For Healey this involves institutionalist and interpretive policy analysis, after Hajer, as the means by which to undertake negotiation for ‘collective action’ (2007:15) and address key planning priorities, such as sustainability. The ‘communicative turn’ in urban planning and governance is grounded in communicative rationality, privileging negotiated meaning and response: not only with non-government stakeholders but with other levels of government. This does not merely refer to the meaning of particular policy statements and objects, but the meaning or reflexive construction of government and governance itself in a federalist context. Howse and Nicolaidis (2001:13-14) identify a dimension of negotiation, arguing that federalism offers more potential than argumentation of hierarchical and competing sovereign governments, especially for establishing forms of bargaining and legitimacy based on contingent structural and systemic arrangements. Subsequently, infrastructure governance can be otherwise imagined as an open or networked system (OMEGA Centre 2012:37ff). Governance is at the heart of policy analysis in complex situations. Policy deliberation predominantly takes place in an agonistic public sphere and, therefore, cannot be separated from its social context, and the social and subjective formation – or agency – of the actors creating it (Hillier 2007:22). Several studies reviewing the effectiveness of urban planning are signalling a clear need for new governance, institutional and policy models to address the scale, scope and complexity of contemporary urban challenges (Sanyal, Vale and Rosan 2012; Gleeson, Dodson and Sipe 2010; Salet, Thornley and Kreukels 2003). Infrastructure offers a realm in which to undertake such reconsideration, particularly given the assertion of an urban ‘governance gap’ (Steele and Gleeson 2010). That governance gap may result from a retreat by government and a turn towards neo-liberal institutional, policy and political settings attuned to pro-growth or postdemocratic governance methods (Gleeson and Low 2000) or it may be, as Hajer suggests (2003), more akin to an ‘institutional void’ in which power unfolds and assembles among heterogeneous entities (Hillier 2007). Governance is embedded in, and constitutive of, urban systems; it has been confounded by structural and systemic shifts such as managerialism, entrepreneurialism and neo-liberalism (Dodson 2009; Graham and Marvin 2001; Gleeson, Dodson and Sipe 2010). Further, there are suggestions that Australia’s urban governance and planning are unsuited for the structural reforms required to address the complex challenges facing cities (Gleeson, Dodson and Sipe 2010:3). Because these are identifiable contextual issues, there is some value, as Albrechts suggests, in examining “what actually takes place – in formal decision-making and implementation, in the transition from plan to formal adoption of the plan and in the actual implementation of the plan” (2006:1488). 1.2. Politics, power and policy At its most rudimentary and aphoristic, Lasswell (1936) defines politics as “who gets what, when, and how”. Weber defines it as being concerned with power (Macht) and as striving for power (Talcott and Weber 1997), while Habermas’ theorisation of communicative rationality and democracy is particularly relevant in his formulation of communicative power (1984) and politics as deliberative (1996). Rather than deliberative rationality, Hillier (2007:3) posits immanence as offering incompleteness, contextuality and conflict. Politics has breadth that extends beyond ‘party politics’ and which refers to social constructions resulting in forms of exclusion and exclusionary decision4 making (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:35; Hillier 2007:37). A Foucaultian construction of power establishes a poststructural conception of the relational, productive, discursive, practiced and strategic dimensions of politics (Foucault 1991; Rabinow 1991) though there is need to create space for interrogation of other, sometimes overwritten, dynamics (Hillier 2007:4). These defining terms present lines of investigation for addressing infrastructure initiatives and negotiations. Spatial and urban theorists have also applied Foucault’s theory of governmentality and art/s of government in considering governance and state power, evoking forces or arrangements of technology, rationality and knowledge (Flyvbjerg 1998) (Sturup 2010). In recognising the political dimensions of decision-making, as a distinct process, Albrechts (2006:1489) also asserts that it warrants scrutiny. Governance, then, is political; it is formative of, and formed by, discourse and power relations. Hajer, whose interpretive policy oeuvre informs Healey’s theories of urban governance, also recognises a shifting exchange between policy and politics, whereby policy initiatives trigger politics: that is, politics is the result of policy. He identifies policy making as a ‘site’ where dynamic socio-cultural and political identities, needs and desires can be negotiated and contested (Hajer 2003:183). In naming an ‘institutional void’ (2003:175), Hajer refers to the inability of institutions – attributable to changing power relations – to provide or implement policy. This requires the creation of governance networks, sometimes decentring, that constitute other power relations. Because the ‘institutional void’ lacks rules and norms for policy and politics to be conducted, they are created in process (Hajer 2003:175). Importantly, Hajer (2003:176) explains that “the polity has become discursive: it cannot be captured in the comfortable terms of generally accepted rules, but is created through deliberation”. In recognising infrastructure as service, Laffin et al. (2013:1) argue that service delivery requires address in terms of policy dynamics rather than generalised ideas of governance. This discursive, intersubjective and deliberative tendency, consistent with the poststructuralism of phronetic planning (Flyvbjerg 2004) and multiplanar theory (Hillier 2007), evokes an awareness of relationality and immanence in the political context. Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002), like Albrechts, also suggest a need for engaging ‘actuality’ which they frame as ‘what is done’ rather than ‘what should be done’. 1.3. Complexity and networks Complexity theory (de Roo, Hillier and Van Wezemael 2012; Hillier 2007) forms linkages to Healey’s and Hillier’s ideas of relationality and immanence, as both are concerned with interpretive, networked and unfolding urban governance and policy; it also informs de Roo and Porter’s proposition for actor consulting and Hajer’s ideas of deliberative policy analysis. As Kooiman (2000:140) suggests, complexity “invites examination of structures, interdependencies and interrelations at and between different levels”. From a governance perspective, networks enable a decentralised or decentralising form of organisation that can respond to rapid change and instability (Hillier 2007; Castells 1996; Beck 1992). In a Federal system, government may be constantly or regularly redefining its role in the infrastructure and urban policy arena. In the face of increased complexity and acceleration, the capacity for decision-making and implementation is challenged. Applying de Roo’s and Porter’s ‘actor-consulting decision-making model’ and ideas of ‘fuzzy governance’, Martens contends that the “aim of the actor-consulting model is to come to a mutually agreed frame of reference that guides regulatory mechanisms in an efficient and effective way” (2007:53). Post-positive or post-structuralist views call for such open-ended approaches recognising the “undecidability of decisions” which are always contestable and exclusionary (Hillier 2007:23). Complexity is also at play as networked governance modalities emerge, and Fels proposes the possibility of ‘collaborative federalism’, as a mode of networked governance and as the means for recognising the need for shared approaches to intergovernmental delivery, particularly for infrastructure (2008:xii). Is governments’ changing role in urban governance better described as a ‘governance gap’ or an ‘institutional void’? This is particularly vexing given governance models, such as pro-growth or postdemocratic governance, that limit stakeholder relevance, rely on ideological rhetorics and divisions, and marginalise policy fields including resilience and sustainability. Arguably, current and ongoing attention to financing for infrastructure is, in part, both attributable to and driving the dynamics of infrastructure governance and the changing role and interaction of government therein. Where the notion of ‘governance gap’ indicates a deficit in governance, engagement and democracy, the notion of ‘institutional void’ may indicate productive or performative potential, particularly in the power dynamics of policy, deliberation and ‘decidability’ in a complex context. The role and purpose of government itself is one of the matters under consideration in intergovernmental negotiations and networks. This is consistent with a more transactive, reflexive, networked or relational approach to governance and acknowledges the distinctly political and performative terrain of infrastructure decision-making in a globalised world. 2. RESEARCH DESIGN This research methodology is framed as phronetic planning research with the intention of undertaking a conceptual and interpretive approach to the research topic, and intended to chart discourse formation in relation to infrastructure decision-making and policy deliberation focused on policy analysis and two case studies. This work recognises that socio-political institutions, such as government, are socially constructed and that actants involved in governance processes exert considerable subjectivity. 2.1. Phronetic planning research In positioning this work as phronetic planning research, it is attentive to power and the exercise of power in intergovernmental relations and infrastructure governance. As such, it focuses on discourse analysis where the intention is “to clarify values, interests, and power relations in planning as a basis for praxis” (Flyvbjerg 2004:290). For Flyvbjerg, phronetic planning research is grounded in real or tangible examples coupled with comprehensive narratives. The purpose is to consider both how power dynamics and values take shape and their implications; this 5 style of research is attentive to consequences and interrogates the possibilities for new narratives and alternative consequences (Flyvbjerg 2004:302). Drawing on the Aristotelian notion of phronesis – understood as ‘practical wisdom’ – phronetic social science is grounded in practice, values and experience (Flyvbjerg, Landmann and Schram 2012; Schram and Caterino 2006). Planning and governance are practices and there is attention to the knowledge derived from practice. Halverson defines phronesis as involving “the ability to understand how complex and messy situations hang together, and to discern the affordances ... whereby appropriate actions might be founded” (Path 2012:71). There is affinity between this and complexity and planning theory as phronesis also implies a collaborative impetus in which action and knowledge are constructed between stakeholders (Greenwood and Levin 2005). Therefore, phronesis provides a framework for thinking and researching in relational ways in order to reveal narratives drawn from experience (Landmann 2012; Kirkeby 2009). It recognises the actor dimensions, and consequently the ‘fuzzy’ dimensions, as per de Roo and Porter (2007), in purportedly rational and objective events such as planning, government and politics. Hillier (2012:43) observes that narrative approaches acknowledge “the subjectivity of knowledge and argue that there is no objective way to determine any ‘correct’ meaning”. It requires engaging the dynamic complexity of multiple small narratives (2007:12). 2.2. Policy analysis The interpretive approach applied here is attentive to discourse, meaning that “ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating and changing them” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:1). It aligns with Hajer’s approach to policy analysis in which he argues the discursiveness of the polity and policy (2003:176). Because discourses are embedded in institutions, they play a significant role in the construction of power relations. Hall (1997:44) explains that discourse for Foucault means: a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment ... Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. Importantly, as discourse constructs knowledge, it also constructs power and power relations. In part, this investigation involves a Foucaultian approach (Rabinow 1991) adopted by Barnes et al. (2006) for their analysis of urban renewal, where power is significantly constructed through the interactions of discourse, institutions and actors. Barnes et al. argue for this approach because “policy is capable of being critiqued as a situated example of the practice of power, as a type of administration through which citizens are governed and through which material spaces are created, contested and reoriented” (2006:36). In adopting an interpretive approach, limited to key policy reforms, attention is given to what government actants do rather than what the policy says (Yanow, 2000). Consequently, the analysis is attentive to reform and changing policy dynamics attributable to changing governments. 2.3. Case study research Phronetic planning research emphasises case study research, as experience and narrative, and this project is limited to two case studies of intergovernmental relations in two infrastructure projects in SEQ: the GCRT project and Brisbane BaT Tunnel (which replaces the Cross River Rail (CRR) proposal). Both projects address significant spatial and transport planning initiatives that link land use and transport as well as pursue an infrastructure system approach to achieve regional or urban outcomes. The initiatives are not just ‘major projects’, that are either inserted into or fragment urban environments, they are part of a more programmed and networked approach to infrastructure including strategic regional and transport planning. The projects were also decided and/or investigated under previous governments applying different planning priorities and policy settings. Consequently, they will reveal the changing nature of governance practice across administrations in response to contextual conditions. In part, the intention is to consider how infrastructure decisions are made by and through government. The cacophony of demands and complaint as represented in the media can sometimes obscure purposeful reform, intentionality and innovation in intergovernmental relations. That is, planning and infrastructure decision-making are regarded as processes of governance involving highly political exchanges and collaboration which are shaped by discourse and power. Planners and other public servants do not, ultimately, make budget decisions or approve plans. The theory addresses governance as a relational activity, and this suggests the need for reflexive policy and political practices from all levels of government, seemingly dependent on the utterances and actions of individual elected representatives. The case studies allow for contextual analysis and interpretation of governance dynamics and offer a means by which to test the findings from the critical review through interpretation of ‘what is actually done’. This research design is intended to reveal the discursive dynamics of infrastructure decision-making including power relations and actor interrelations. Adopting an interpretive approach, it has regard for phronesis and recognises that power is negotiated and enacted through discourse. In focusing on the relationship between infrastructure, policy and governance, as one aspect of spatial governance and planning, there is an attempt to address what Hillier refers to as a small narrative or “a focus on parts while still trying to see a constantly changing, impossible ‘whole’” (2007:12). In addressing the construction of infrastructure governance through discourse analysis, this research endeavours to interrogate intergovernmental dynamics and relations as policy deliberation limited to two case studies. An interpretive approach is adopted as a strategy for considering narratives emerging from the ‘institutional void’ through policy deliberation as accounts of ‘what is done’ by elected representatives and governments in negotiating infrastructure. 6 3. FINDINGS Through policy review and case studies, governance and intergovernmental dynamics in infrastructure decisionmaking are revealed. The intention is to unfurl narratives of power dynamics, in ways that reveal policy deliberation as performative and as an account of ‘what really happens’. These findings are presented in two sections. First, the policy review elaborates the changing policy context as the ‘site’ of political deliberation. Second, two SEQ case studies, GCRT and BaT Tunnel, are presented as narratives of policy deliberation and intergovernmental relations. 3.1. Policy and governance context Federal and State Government policy frames the deliberative and decision-making processes of the two case studies. Given the separation of powers between the levels of government, the State Government is principally responsible for metropolitan planning, services and governance including the provision of infrastructure (Sansom, Dawkins and Tan 2012:4; Bunker and Searle 2009:105). Vertical fiscal imbalance results in State reliance on the Federal Government for funding and other resources. Local government, established through State Government legislation, exercises limited urban and regional governance and service provision, while leveraging subsidiarity. Consequently, infrastructure decision-making occurs in a complex policy and intergovernmental assemblage which has, over the past several years, seen significant reform. 3.1.1. Federal policy context In 2006, the Council of Australia Governments (COAG) introduced the National Reform Agenda (NRA) which aimed to enhance productivity and competitiveness, including in infrastructure sectors (McInerney, Nadarajah and Perkins 2006:29). Australia has experienced some historic and political weaknesses in the national coordination and delivery of infrastructure resulting in an infrastructure deficit. In 2007, the Rudd Government took carriage of major infrastructure and urban policy reforms, which reflected the NRA as well as concerns articulated in Intergenerational Reports. The National Urban Policy (NUP) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) also addressed an infrastructure remit. Reforms included the establishment of Infrastructure Australia (IA) and evidence-based policy. Prime Minister Rudd expressed particular concern about institutional and intergovernmental arrangements with a view to developing ‘cooperative federalism’, an infrastructure pipeline, consistent PPP guidelines and private sector investment (Rudd 2008). A prioritisation methodology was developed by IA, which ultimately included investment in rail and public transport, and Rudd affirmed the need for transparency, rigour, integrity and independent advice in infrastructure decision-making. IA’s priorities include attention to urban infrastructure recognising that cities are drivers of productivity and competitiveness. In April 2013, leading up to the September Federal election, then Opposition Leader Tony Abbott stated that urban rail projects would not attract Coalition investment, asserting that rail was a State Government responsibility. He stated “[i]t's important that we stick to our knitting, and the Commonwealth's knitting when it comes to funding infrastructure, is roads” (Ironside 2013a). September 2013 saw the election of a Coalition Government led by Tony Abbott. At the State of Australian Cities Conference held in November 2013, the Coalition Government’s Minister for Environment, Greg Hunt, outlined his government’s approach to environmental issues, flagging the Federal Government’s commitment to “an ambitious infrastructure agenda”, demonstrated in part by policy reforms and an infrastructure pipeline reflecting priorities of all levels of government (Hunt 2013). Although he stressed that government should offer some long term vision and “roadmap” for cities, the Federal Government withdrew from urban policy. The Major Cities Unit, as the policy unit developing NUP initiated by the Rudd Government, was axed in September 2013. In the first COAG meeting between Prime Minister Abbott and the State Premiers, it was agreed to prioritise infrastructure; the meeting did not address other metropolitan planning issues (COAG Communique 2013). IA stresses a need for integrated infrastructure planning and development, and a recent IA report on urban transport affirms the principle of enhanced transport and land use integration. The report also stresses that the Federal Government’s contribution to public transport is discretionary. In outlining draft principles for a national urban transport infrastructure strategy, IA considered governance issues and called for a national approach, recognition of the Federal Government’s role to exert influence, ensure consistency and invest, and consistency in information collection, analysis and reporting (Infrastructure Australia 2013). Early in 2014, the Federal Government proposed changes to IA’s corporate structure, limiting IA’s powers to act without Ministerial direction. Current Federal Government commitments are focused on roads and a 15-year Priority Infrastructure List will be developed; this will be similar to the existing National Priority List. Other policy shifts will also impact on intergovernmental relations such as incentivised asset recycling and assertion of traditional roles and responsibilities of the levels of government. 3.1.2. Queensland policy context In Queensland, planning requirements are set out under the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 and Sustainable Planning and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Fig. 1). The legislative amendment is part of a suite of deregulatory planning reforms under the Newman Government to promote investment, growth and development. The intention is to provide greater flexibility and discretion to local government (DSDIP 2014). The State Government has articulated a pro-growth governance approach that emphasises economic development in all planning and infrastructure provision. While regional plans provide the spatial and land use parameters of infrastructure provision, other policies frame governance and decision-making. The State Government has introduced an Infrastructure for Economic Development Framework (DSDIP 2013), a major projects unit within Queensland Treasury and Trade, and the advisory body Infrastructure Queensland (Infrastructure Queensland 2014). A State Infrastructure Plan is 7 forthcoming and the State Government has categorised infrastructure in terms of ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’. Having warned against ‘gold plating’, a decision-making hierarchy for addressing options has been established (DSDIP 2013:14) Source: DSDIP 2013 Figure 1: Queensland planning framework In SEQ, local authority planning schemes are framed by the South East Queensland Regional Plan 2009-2031 (SEQRP) which is a statutory strategic planning document originally produced by the former Government. Local authority planning schemes also include a Priority Infrastructure Plan, which sets out infrastructure needs and infrastructure charging. While the South East Queensland Infrastructure Plan and Program 2010-2031 (SEQIPP) provided an implementation framework under the SEQRP, it will not be maintained by the current government. The SEQRP is under review to comply with current policy directions including State Planning Policy which articulates the government’s infrastructure (and other) interests in relation to land use. However, other revised regional plans have lost the strategic weight indicating a retreat from strategic planning, identified as a trend by Albrechts since the 1980s (2006:1490). The State Government has also instigated processes such as The Queensland Plan, as a 30-year strategic statewide vision, and participatory budgeting to accustom the community to ‘trade-offs’ and ‘strong choices’ to manage service provision and debt. 3.2. Case studies The case studies of infrastructure projects in two local government areas in SEQ – Gold Coast City Council (GCCC) and Brisbane City Council (BCC) – reveal an array of intergovernmental dealings. The focus here is not on project management, the efficacy of cost benefit analysis or financing, but rather policy deliberation as practiced through intergovernmental negotiations, and the process of decision-making in relation to infrastructure. As the projects are at different stages, the analysis will not endeavour to undertake a whole of project comparison, focusing principally on preliminary intergovernmental decision-making. The key elements of the projects are summarised in Table 1 and a chronology is presented in Table 2. As can be seen in Table 2, while not a trend, some years in which there has been a change of government or election have seen greater intensity of public discussion and/or activity in the projects. This is further indicated by reportage in the state newspaper, The Courier-Mail. A tally of mentions of the projects in The Courier-Mail was conducted for the period 1 January 2000 to 15 April 2014 as an indication of public debate and is included in Table 2. The detailed case studies are included in Appendix 1 and summaries appear in the sections below. 8 Table 1: Summary points about GCRT and BaT Tunnel Coalition, 1996-2007 Labor, 2007-2013 Coalition, Since 2013 Labor, 1998-2012 LNP, Since 2012 BaT Tunnel Transport (bus and train, initially proposed as rail only) Federal (until 2014), State and Local Federal Government State Government Infrastructure class Levels of government involved First recommendation Integrated planning GCRT Transport (light rail) Federal, State and Local 1997 Integrated Regional Transport Plan for South East Queensland, State Government 1998 Line Haul Public Transport Foundation and Feasibility Study, joint State and Local Government 1997 Integrated Regional Transport Plan for South East Queensland South East Queensland Infrastructure Plan and Program 2006-2026 Gold Coast City Transport Strategy 2031 Project leadership Public private partnership Assessment by Infrastructure Australia Local Government Availability PPP model Deemed ready to proceed by IA in 2009 as a priority project Institutional arrangements MOU between State and Local Government Steering Committee established for planning and business case; Governance body established involving all levels of government for Stage 1 Stage of development Near completion; trialling due to open in mid 2014 9 2008 Inner City Rail Capacity Study, State Government 2011 Suburbs 2 City Buslink, Report in 2013, BCC South East Queensland Infrastructure Plan and Program 2006-2026 Connecting SEQ 2031 – An Integrated Regional Transport Plan for South East Queensland BCC City Centre Masterplan State Government Availability PPP model (offered) Deemed as having potential by IA in 2009, threshold in 2011 and ready to proceed in 2012 as a priority project Steering Committee involving Federal, State and Local Government (for CRR) MOU between Federal and State Government BaT Tunnel to include “a robust governance structure”; consultation currently underway Project team involving Federal, State and Local Government as well as experts (for BaT Tunnel) Concept design including stakeholder/community consultation, Environmental Impact Statement Table 2: Chronology of Case Study Project Development # Media Reports – CM 1 GCRT 1997 Integrated Regional Transport Plan for South East Queensland, State Government 1998 Line Haul Public Transport Foundation and Feasibility Study, joint State and Local Government Approach to Federal Government for funding unsuccessful 14 Feasibility study commissioned 3 Federal funding granted 1 Feasibility study finalised 1 Ongoing studies; Council conflict 1 MOU between Council and State Government; Inclusion in SEQIPP Ongoing studies 2 13 6 Ongoing studies; GCCC committed funds based on preliminary business case Preliminary business case finalised; declared nationally significant and ‘ready to proceed’ by IA; Commonwealth Game bid successful; State Government commits to first two stages; Federal Government commits funding Commencement of State Government funded works; Procurement stage: call for bids to build and operate light rail; Connecting SEQ 2031 – An Integrated Regional Transport Plan for South East Queensland 3 Additional studies; Successful bid announced 3 Delivery 6 2 (to 14/4) Delivery Trials completed; services to commence mid year Year BaT Tunnel # Media Reports – CM 1997 1998 20002001 2001 Federal Election State Election 2002 2004 Federal Election State Election 2005 2006 State Election 2007 Change of Federal Govt 2008 Inner City Rail Capacity Study 3 2009 State Election CRR proposal publicly announced; Deemed as having potential by IA; Feasibility study commenced; Funding from Federal Government 7 2010 Federal Election Connecting SEQ 2031 – An Integrated Regional Transport Plan for South East Queensland 48 2011 Suburbs 2 City Buslink announced BCC; CRR deemed by IA as a threshold project; Project delayed due to disaster recovery 37 2012 Change of State Govt CRR deemed ready to proceed as a priority project; Expert panel review of project 25 2008 2013 Change of Federal Govt 2014 10 Suburbs 2 City Buslink Report; Federal Government commits funds; conflict between State and Federal Governments; Premier confirms project will not proceed and rejects Federal funding offer; Abbott rejects rail funding; State Government announces Brisbane Underground/UBAT with first plans released; included in Draft BCC City Centre Maserplan Further plans released; UBAT renamed BaT Tunnel and reconfigured; project team established; consultations with industry and community underway; Construction due to commence in 2015 with completion in 2020. 95 5 (to 14/4) 3.2.1. Gold Coast Rapid Transit 3.2.1.1. Project description The Gold Coast Rapid Transit (GCRT) project is light rail running on a 13km line linking key centres and 16 stations from Griffith University – Gold Coast to Broadbeach, with additional stages proposed (Fig. 2). Source: Department of Transport and Main Roads Figure 2. Proposed GCRT route, including Stage One Broadbeach to Griffith University 3.2.1.2. Intergovernmental relations Intergovernmental relations and decision-making in this project have addressed funder priorities and consensus building, with initial conflict and uncertainty about the project addressed early and the levels of government having negotiated outcomes in relation to policy. State and Local Government initially partnered on the project, seeking Federal Government funding and support from Prime Minister Howard. However, when an opportunity arose to allocate funds to the project in 2001, Federal Cabinet funded projects in Liberal held electorates. This prompted accusations of pork barrelling and political decision-making (Parnell 2001b:1). State and Local Government commissioned a feasibility study in 2001, with the Federal Government allocating funds in 2002 on the understanding that the project, while ordinarily a State Government responsibility, had significant scope and that further funding was dependent on the feasibility study findings. In 2005, there was disagreement in the Council with then GCCC Mayor Ron Clark opposed the project principally on the grounds of cost and all other Councillors supported it. While rapid transit was supported, there was division about the mode – light rail or bus. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between State and Local Government was signed in 2006. The GCRT project was included in SEQIPP with a funding commitment. By 2008, a preliminary business case supported the project with recommendations for Stage One, and GCCC committed funds. The Gillard Government’s emphasis on city building provided further impetus for compact and sustainable development. As an ‘agent of change’ style of project, GCRT aims to catalyse urban development and value uplift as well as constrain urban sprawl and address congestion. With COAG having endorsed national PPP guidelines, the GCRT met the need for a demonstration project. The Federal Government guarantees private debt; the availability PPP model was regarded as a highly effective way of accessing private financing for large public infrastructure projects. In 2009, IA declared the project ‘ready to proceed’, one of the first projects to be approved by the body. The State Government also announced the Gold Coast’s successful XXI Commonwealth Games bid and promised to complete the first two stages of the GCRT project by 2013 (Policies and Promises 2009:56). The project was included in the 11 National Infrastructure Priority List, Federal funds were committed. The project was established with a governance structure involving all levels of government. Procurement stage proceeded with funding commitments from all levels of government and the commencement of State Government funded works prior to seeking bids from operators under a public-private partnership. The State Government announced the GoldlinQ consortium as the successful bidder to build and operate the light rail in May 2011 (Foster 2011:78). With trials completed, services are due to commence in June 2014. 3.2.2. Brisbane BaT Tunnel 3.2.2.1. Project description Brisbane BaT (Bus and Train) Tunnel replaces the CRR initiative (Fig. 3) after several years of studies and negotiations. Both the former State and Federal Governments committed to the CRR which was comprised of an 18 km north-south rail line through Brisbane's inner city, including underground lines, adding passenger and freight train services with additional lines and four stations between Salisbury and Bowen Hills through Brisbane's CBD. When a Liberal National Party (LNP) government was elected in 2012, the project was redeveloped as Underground Bus and Train (UBAT) (Fig. 4). Incorporating recommendations from the BCC’s Suburbs 2 City bus project, the project was renamed the BaT Tunnel in March 2014 (Fig. 5). The Department of Main Roads and Transport (n.d.) describes it as a “5km north-south tunnel that will deliver rail and bus together in a world-first design. It combines a railway and a busway in a single, double-decked, 15m-wide tunnel beneath the Brisbane River and Brisbane’s central business district”. Source: Department of Transport and Main Roads, 2011 Figure 3: Study area for the Cross River Rail. Source: Department of Transport and Main Roads, 2014 12 Figure 4: Concept design and plan of two level tunnel for UBAT Source: Department of Transport and Main Roads, 2014 Figure 5: Proposed route of Brisbane BaT Tunnel 3.2.2.2. Intergovernmental relations When first identified by a 2008 study that found rail capacity would be reached by 2016, a ‘metro’ style underground was proposed. With the looming 2016 deadline, a river crossing was considered vital for ensuring effectiveness of other rail network upgrades in Brisbane. The Bligh State Government received funds from the Federal Government for a feasibility study for CRR in 2009 with the project identified as having potential by IA (Fig. 3). Due to budgetary pressures resulting from disaster recovery, the project was delayed. In 2011, then BCC Lord Mayor Campbell Newman stood down to be leader of the LNP, making CRR a talking point on the grounds of cost. The chronology of events is captured in Table 2 including the funding commitments made by government. While the State Government remained committed to the project, the Opposition pledged to consider more affordable alternatives. When LNP won the election in March, Premier Newman announced a review of the project to devise a cheaper alternative (Ironside 2012b:2), with the expectation of private sector investment (Ironside 2012a:2). Subsequent newspaper reports reveal antagonistic communications between the State and Federal Governments with particular emphasis on funding. The Federal Government allocated funding to the CRR in the 2013-14 Federal Budget (Scott 2013). However, Premier Newman confirmed on 23 May 2013 that the joint funding arrangement with the Federal Government would be rejected (Ironside 2013d). Further meetings between the levels of government were held, but agreement could not be reached. Following the Coalition’s Federal election win in late 2013 and withdrawal from rail and public transport funding, the State Government pledged to build the Brisbane Underground, a bus and rail transport tunnel beneath the Brisbane River. Joint Federal-State funding arrangements for road infrastructure flagged greater Federal Government contributions. Consequently, funds would be available for the Brisbane Underground and the first plans showed a two level tunnel from Dutton Park to Bowen Hills (Fig. 4) with three centrally located stations. Known as Underground Bus and Train (UBAT), the proposal blends the State Government’s CRR and BCC’s Suburbs 2 City (BCC 2013) projects to achieve a multimodal underground transit corridor. The project, renamed the BaT (Bus and Train Tunnel) in April 2014, is possible due to infrastructure recycling incentives announced by the Federal Government. The State Government released preliminary plans for the BaT Tunnel in April 2014 with ongoing refinement and business case preparation underway. A project team is comprised of representatives from several government departments, including Treasury, BCC and the private sector as well as industry experts. The Federal and State Treasurers are ‘talking’ and PPP arrangements, such as those used for the GCRT project, are under consideration (Moore 2014). Industry briefings have also been undertaken and the State Government is seeking input from industry and facilitating community consultation. The policy overview indicates that the institutional landscape of urban policy and planning is undergoing significant change, particularly in terms of deregulation, government responsibilities and governance. Changing policy settings influence the formation and implementation of infrastructure initiatives – as plan, as process and as project. The case studies indicate both projects involved contingent decision-making, where earlier decisions were open to challenge. In initial stages the levels of government were involved in centralised and hierarchical dialogue as distinct from networked governance. Both projects have seen a stop-start dynamic – while GCRT was ‘fast tracked’, the BaT Tunnel underwent significant reconfiguration. Additionally the introduction of IA seems to have impacted on the intensity and timing of interactions about the projects. The post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) context, however, resulted in significant political apprehension and tension in the negotiation of cost, risk and responsibility through the government hierarchy and vertical service delivery chain. The case studies acknowledge that while power in intergovernmental relations remains highly centralised, there is co-dependence among all levels of government in terms of governance and financing. However, the case studies highlight the central roles played by elected representatives and media in negotiations and in constructing an agonistic space of public debate and engagement. There are indications that public attention to infrastructure projects – particularly in terms of Federal-State relations – can increase in election years. These initiatives are significantly shaped by contextual, discursive and intersubjective relations that shape political culture and, in turn, shaped by the dynamics of power and power-play. 13 4. DISCUSSION Infrastructure is generally intended for common or public use, and the onus has been on government to determine its th need and delivery since the early 20 century (Gleeson, Dong and Low 2007). For more than two decades, however, governments have moved from acting as principal providers of infrastructure to competitive market stimulation and partnership brokers (Australian Treasury 2007; SMART Infrastructure Facility 2014). Such a transition requires new, even innovative, approaches to policy, regulation, planning and governance, recognising relational dynamics and spatial relationships. The two case studies present specific scenarios of how governments negotiate their role and interactions. There is particular emphasis on policy negotiation and policy networks which can require reflexive or adaptive rules (Rotmans, Loorbach and Kemp 2012:184). Current attention to infrastructure, including media coverage, public inquiries and policy development, suggest a need for infrastructure governance reform in response to contextual pressures. In particular, as editorialising has indicated, there is a narrative of governance failure, or an ‘inability to get things done’. As the case studies demonstrate, drift from policy and agreed rules, as institutional discourse and power settings, does occur. At the Inaugural National Urban Policy Conference (May 2013), the then Federal Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, Anthony Albanese, lauded his government’s achievements in urban and infrastructure policy and governance reform. In reflecting on the challenges of working with the States, he said: [w]e can’t intervene to make states do the right thing by the constituencies that elect them, but we can work with states on good outcomes and ... we worked with Queensland and Victoria over a two year period to progress what they both said were their number one priorities – Cross-River rail in Brisbane ... and the Melbourne Metro Project, both of which are essential to avoid gridlock (Albanese 2013). Notably, infrastructure provision is regularly narrated in terms of disaster avoidance, like ‘avoiding gridlock’, rather than as urban resilience and sustainability. Albanese, then campaigning for the 2013 Federal election, acknowledged the responsibilities each level of government must shoulder, as well as the need to negotiate those responsibilities beyond election cycles, apportioned sovereignties and short term interests. That is, Albanese was effectively proposing flexible and open governance processes; there was intentionality in these statements reflecting more performative and networked governance. The case study projects were particularly reliant on the interactions between elected representatives and, in a postdemocratic context, this involves significant attention to electoral processes where infrastructure became an election issue, mired in adversarial narratives of government waste and inefficiency. Infrastructure initiatives may be served by processes in which the levels of government negotiate the nature of their relationship and role to build agreement (or vision) at an early stage. However, the postdemocratic frame adds complication that explicitly links policy process and election cycles. As with GCRT, there is efficacy in agreeing to governance process as early as possible to engage in joint decisions or ‘governing through governance’ (Bache 2003) rather than continuing bargaining or talking processes. While commentaries about the cases are highly rhetorical, subjective and deterministic, there are indications that intergovernmental relations require ongoing clarification and negotiation based on contextual (relational, spatial) and intentional (intersubjective, actant) factors. Both the GCRT and BaT Tunnel, as public transport initiatives, are major interventions into the urban environment that have required the involvement of all levels of government and attracted significant public commentary. Both projects are intended to significantly alter patterns of urban development as well as social behaviour, recognising that infrastructure networks are moulding urban environments and that political decisions about infrastructure, often elevated above planning processes, require scrutiny at all stages of implementation (Gleeson and Steele 2009; Dodson 2009; Graham and Marvin 2001). While flexibility is apparent, including horizontal networks, infrastructure initiatives tend to align to vertical service delivery and funding regimes. 4.1. Framing There is public debate highlighting a level of dissatisfaction with infrastructure governance arrangements, with calls to rethink the role of government and improve cooperation between governments (Eddington 2013; Keen 2013). Cooperative governance is evident in GCRT and less so in the BaT Tunnel. As governments are unable to realise policy ambitions without support from other levels of government, the private sector and/or the public, the ‘institutional void’ necessitates relational and contingent approaches. Submissions to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into Public Infrastructure (2014) raise issues such as transparency, coordination, politics and decision-making, as well as evoking politically unpopular possibilities, such as asset sales, an issue implicated in the Bligh Government’s election defeat (Wear 2014). Given concerns about financial risk in relation to infrastructure, these additional issues are considered as significant risks from various stakeholders, indicating that the actions of government itself generates risk, even distrust. Risk is writ large in these projects as both floundered when governments and elected representatives expressed concerns about cost and the desire to pursue cheaper alternatives. This means, as Hajer suggests, “new institutional rules ... new norms of appropriate behaviour and ... new conceptions of legitimate political intervention” may be required as part of ongoing policy deliberation (2003:176). Yet, the Abbott government is asserting governance which strictly delineates and silos the roles and responsibilities of Federal and State Government rather than address these responsibilities as part of an interconnected system of governance. The Federal Government stresses ‘productive infrastructure’, as a particular class of infrastructure directly tied to capitalism and agglomeration, in order to attract ‘incentives’, as distinct from ‘funding’. The shifting language of policy is creating highly ideological and rhetorical constructs of inclusionary/exclusionary meaning-making and decisionmaking. There remains a need to establish governance frameworks that better situate infrastructure as intrinsic to sustainable urban development. 14 4.2. Government and governance Under the umbrella of Australian federalism, urban and regional governance attracts scrutiny due to intergovernmental relations grounded in fiscal, constitutional and policy determinations. While State Governments are vested with principal responsibility for urban planning and development, other levels of government also play roles in policy, funding, planning, coordination and other related decision-making arenas. The nature of intergovernmental relations in the Australian Federal system calls for diverse interactions and negotiations. Any interaction between governments is likely to involve other stakeholders and other systems; recognition that governance requires and is constituted as multiplicity or assemblage. Such interactions are increasingly networked even when the governance network is highly centralised (Neal 2013). The Productivity Commission indicates that perspectives about government’s role, institutional arrangements and the expectations in infrastructure decision-making and provision are divergent and that ongoing reform is required (2014:218), indicative of governance as immanent. Commentaries about transparency and poor decision-making continue, for example in the media and the Productivity Commission Inquiry, despite significant reforms in infrastructure planning, indicating that governance, particularly government decision-making, is an ongoing reform concern. Yet, projects like the GCRT are based on networked governance arrangements, as negotiated through policy frameworks. In realising GCRT, the local authority assumed leadership, including coordination of other levels of government. This not only demonstrates the potential for PPPs but also exemplifies how government can negotiate complex intergovernmental arrangements beyond traditional and hierarchical divides. The GCRT emerges as an example that is beginning to model relational dynamics of governance. For the BaT Tunnel, relations between the levels of government shifted several times with the State Government seeking ‘new rules’, developing a partnership with BCC and, ultimately, rejecting Federal funding. The antagonisms between the levels of government, arising from the agonistic space of intersubjective exchanges between elected representatives, have seen the project significantly reformulated. 4.3. Changing dynamics Broader system dynamics are at play. Planning and infrastructure development enter into complex exchanges where infrastructure development triggers planning rather than vice versa. Similarly, Sturup has found that “[s]trategic planning ... needs to find a complementary relationship to [Mega Urban Transport Projects] rather than trying to fit within them” (2010:14). This not only supports the proposition that there is discontinuity between urban planning and infrastructure development, but also points to an urban governance challenge of the nature Hajer describes where policy triggers politics: inherently performative and contextual. As is evident in the case studies, there is not so much a new consensus emerging about infrastructure and governance, but flexible power dynamics and rules constituted through policy deliberation that are repositioning government and infrastructure within competing and differentiated agendas and narratives, indicating as Hillier describes a difference between power as domination and power as capacities (2007:321). Tony Abbott aims to be the ‘Prime Minister for Infrastructure’, but his government will only fund roads and is more attentive to traditionally fragmented and hierarchal constructs of government, than to integrated spatial strategy and networked governance. While the GCRT progressed from idea to reality through a new policy process, the BaT Tunnel negotiations were conflictual and ultimately regarded as wasteful, resulting in a revision of the project that has attracted expert criticism (Hale 2012). Martens’ assertion that “[t]he role of each actor will affect, and be affected by, the mode of governance in place for a particular planning issue” (2007:54) affirms that contextual issues and political commitment shape policy deliberation. Infrastructure funding and planning at both the Federal and State levels has undergone considerable reform, including the establishment of statutory authorities, special purpose vehicles and new bureaucracy, and there is continuing scrutiny of appropriate governance and institutional arrangements (Hulten and Schwab 1997). As Ericson asserts “[t]he rather large network of well-informed state and business ‘stakeholders’, with a vested interest in infrastructure policy, makes for a complex policy subsystem” (2008:406) that has bearing on planning and government decision-making. Infrastructure governance has been the subject of a changing discourse that is recasting power relations and power-play. Under the previous Federal Labor Government, multilevel governance was more explicitly practiced with urban and infrastructure policy outcomes including GCRT and potentially CRR. Under the current government, policy decision-making is returning to traditional Federal and State roles and responsibilities for infrastructure while creating incentives to the States to pursue other alternatives, such as the sale, or recycling, of government owned assets in order to invest in infrastructure. Despite recognition that Australia’s Federal system is becoming increasingly networked and collaborative and that the role of government can be negotiated among stakeholders, historic constructs of Federal-State relations can undermine networked and integrative decision-making (Glover 2013:9). 4.4. Implications for infrastructure and urban governance Infrastructure and its future has attracted a significant amount of independent and commissioned research, particularly in relation to funding, infrastructure markets, competition and public-private partnerships (SMART Infrastructure Facility 2014; Wellman and Spiller 2012; Productivity Commission 2013), as well as theoretical work that addresses infrastructure systems, urban fragmentation and spatial restructuring. Flyvbjerg’s (2005) study of major projects has also revealed the failures of a range of planning tools such as projections, cost-benefit analysis and other forms of modelling and project management, while attention to sustainability and climate change challenges decision-making and governance processes (de Roo and Porter 2007; Voogd and Woltjer 2007) and exposed a ‘governance gap’, even governance failure, arising from splintered urbanism (Gleeson, Dodson and Sipe 2010; Steele and Gleeson 2010; Graham and Marvin 2001). Government has consistently played a lead role in infrastructure provision for reasons of equity and market failure. State Governments particularly play a central role in infrastructure and the Productivity Commission has identified transparency and certainty in decision-making as issues 15 for reform (Productivity Commission 2013). The role of government in governance may, typically, be that of ‘network manager’ or coordinator navigating currents of complexity and uncertainty rather than as central power or authority (Kickert et al. 1997:11; Martens 2007). Government plays this role in both the GCRT and BaT Tunnel with varying degrees of success and impact. In the face of policy reforms, appeals to traditional responsibilities of the levels of government may not yield the results required for dynamic and integrated infrastructure networks that enable sustainable development. State Governments, as has been seen in relation to the BaT Tunnel, may not be willing to fund infrastructure unless other incentives are made available, such as the Federal Government’s plan to incentivise State Government public asset recycling (privatisation) in order to finance infrastructure (‘Asset plan will boost company tax: Cormann’ 2014). However, urban splintering manifests in the dislocation of infrastructure from spatial strategy making, resulting in separation of spatial planning and infrastructure (Graham and Marvin 2001; Albrechts 2006); infrastructure development can undermine sustainability and other principles embedded in metropolitan strategic plans (Steele and Gleeson 2010:306). There are suggestions that network governance can be further developed through the establishment of agreed performance based delegations to sub-national levels of government, such as the UK’s City Deals (Cabinet Office, HM Government 2011) which represented a ‘step change’ in intergovernmental relations by offering longer term investment, devolution and transactional opportunities for cities. This, however, requires systemic change that shifts power relations and affirms subsidiarity. The GCRT initiative, while not wholly devolved, demonstrated devolved urban governance. A strong sense of contingency emerges from the case studies, particularly in relation to the intentionality and performativity of the interrelations between elected representatives, occurring in an agonistic space. Such decisionmaking processes can appear antagonistic, ‘ruleless’ and rivalrous – particularly in the BaT Tunnel case. However, when responsive to context, as the decision-making for both projects has been, they appear more open and flexible, although not ‘open systems’ given the nature of power relations and power-play (OMEGA Centre 2012). The governance process can be interpreted and understood through the discursive practices that shape it, resulting from its social construction and context, in accordance with the beliefs and values of actors participating in the negotiation or dialogue (Bevir 2011). The case studies highlight the institutional dimensions of policy deliberation and power relations as predominantly hierarchical, centralised and vertical rather than networked, yet still indicative of institutional change. The case studies reveal varying levels of conflict, cooperation and crisis resulting from intergovernmental relations, including the porosity of responsibilities between the levels of government. While indicative of a postdemocratic condition, this also evokes antagonism and power-play. Politicisation is part of this process in the sense that policy triggers politics and political figures play a prominent role. As seen in the 2010 Victorian election (Davidson 2010) and the 2012 Queensland election (Wear 2014), infrastructure, including transport and asset sales, is an election issue. Given government’s central role in infrastructure governance and delivery, infrastructure failures can be generally attributed to government decision-making and governance. Yet, the GCRT and BaT Tunnel indicate that context and intentionality influence governance in processual ways: interactions between governments involve many more stakeholders than government alone. The CGRT indicates that new policy frameworks worked, although the BaT Tunnel indicates that there is a need for both certainty and adaptability in infrastructure planning: a potential mismatch between planning and implementation that requires governance to be developed in process, as immanent or as ‘open system’ and involving performative decision-making and deliberation among multiple governments. CONCLUSION This research has investigated intergovernmental and policy dynamics in relation to infrastructure governance. The performative construction of power in decision-making, which impacts urban environments, socio-technological networks and spatial relationships, is traced through policy narratives. The policy and discourse analysis, addressing policy reform and two infrastructure case studies, indicates that infrastructure is a political and potentially divisive issue. Repeated discursive and performative practices affirm changeable roles of government in governance. Applying an interpretive approach, the case studies form a partial narrative of infrastructure governance in SEQ, highlighting the interplay of context and intentionality in policy deliberation that models the role of government and intergovernmental relations. Governance, as a central theme in infrastructure policy and planning, determines and is determined by ‘how power is exercised’ (Flyvbjerg 2004:294). Planning occurs in a governmental realm and requires engagement with the political as constitutive of, or inflected in, infrastructure governance. Therefore planners should reflect on the implications of this relationship for governance and practice. Politics is not exclusively about the machinations of government or political parties, but rather involves diverse powers, actors, behaviours and practices interacting to influence or exercise public decision-making and policy deliberation. This analysis highlights institutional arrangements and initiatives by which government has engaged in infrastructure decision-making and public debate in order to deliver major catalyst projects. As governments take sizeable risks – and pose risks – that are not a natural fit with election cycles and budgetary pressures, there is a tendency for hierarchical and closed processes. Prior to formalising ‘a project’, key political and government figures engage in policy deliberation: interacting performatively and discursively. Articulations of rationalism such as policy and cost-benefit do not necessarily stabilise decision-making and governance in a complex situation. As the former Federal Labor Government introduced sweeping policy and institutional reforms, which proved effective and enabled both projects to proceed through collaboration to varying degrees, there was ‘trial and error’ and turbulence in implementation (Albrechts, Alden and Pires 2001:258). 16 The role and agency of elected representatives, particularly at the leadership and ministerial level, is highlighted and captured through public discourse as attempts to change agreed rules. The case studies reflect intergovernmental and power relations, highlighting the partiality of those key actors in bargaining and competing as embodiments of the governance and policy process. Such bargaining, as performative and intentional, is a prelude to the formation of a project and subsequent stages of policy and governance. Commentaries also occur in the public sphere, particularly through and with the media, where projects can become openly contested, sometimes coinciding with elections, indicating postdemocratic, performative and agonistic characteristics. Despite policy reforms, some critics continue to evoke ‘politicisation’ (Hale 2012; Business SA 2013) or ‘weak public debate’ (Consult Australia 2013; Colebatch 2012), that results in ‘system failure’ (MacDonald 2013) and ‘poor and opaque decision-making’ (SMART Infrastructure Facility 2014; Consult Australia 2013; Committee for Melbourne 2013). Detailed accounts, including first person narratives, are required to clarify values and intention as well as bridge this sense of misfit or perceived governance deficit. Further research is warranted to refine and assess the role of elected representatives and governance modalities; alternative policy networks and systems may be beneficial, especially in engaging the community in public deliberation. Consideration of the role of government – and specifically elected representatives – in relation to infrastructure governance is required given the reassertion of hierarchical Federal-State divides in an ever-networked world that relies on fuzzy governance modes in complex system operating at multiple spatial scales, including global. The Federal-State division is entrenched by the 2014-15 Federal Budget, which prioritises road infrastructure and incentivises asset sales, changes the governance system dynamics by, for example, pressuring the States to make unpopular decisions to further unbundle socio-technological networks (Bliemer et al. 2014; Colebatch 2012). The ‘institutional void’, as an expression of uncertainty resulting from global and regional complexity, can offer a productive site of political and policy deliberation. That is, policy provides the impetus for political action and governance innovation in areas such as infrastructure decision-making. However, government, as the 2014-15 Federal Budget attests, advocate for or announce projects prior to the completion of due diligence and business cases. Infrastructure governance involves tension and drift between networked, multilevel and hierarchical modalities of governance and power distribution. As governments change and new policies are developed, other ‘rule-making’ efforts and values emerge in process. Such processes can be turbulent and contested on a project-by-project basis, dependent on the actors involved: as both projects demonstrate intergovernmental cooperation is changeable and complex. This highlights the need to be cognisant of the relationship between ‘who is involved’ and the mode of governance. Those actants are both influenced by, and influence, the mode of governance and the relations therein. Despite the tendency to extricate infrastructure from planning, policy deliberation can result in governance where attention shifts from institutions and structures to actors and systems (including discursive systems). Consequently, the agency of particular actors, such as elected representatives, is drawn into sharper focus in order to understand ‘what is actually done’ and how projects proceed. Policy deliberation results in variable roles and governance approaches being asserted. Governance is, in itself, a type of infrastructure. Dynamic, even contradictory, narratives of politics and governance with regard to infrastructure have been made explicit in this study, both as they are represented in policy and as they are performed. While definitive conclusions or learnings are not evident, this thesis provides grounds for further research addressing the contextual, discursive and intentional dimensions of governance as intersubjective and processual, requiring both internal and external perspectives. A future research question would address the efficacy and flexibility of processes and practices of rule-making in governance systems and modalities so as to assess the role of government in managing risk, intergovernmental relations and adaptive service and planning systems. Such ongoing research can enable further development of governance systems in their complexity and reflexivity – recognising the specificity and partiality of particular actants – and in relation to spatial strategy, socio-technological systems and sustainable urban development. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The guidance of my supervisor, Professor David Jones, is gratefully acknowledged. REFERENCES Albanese, A. (2013a, May 17) Retrieved March 10, 2014, from Anthony Albanese MP: http://anthonyalbanese.com.au/economic-productivity-and-the-city-address-to-national-urban-policy-conferenceaustralian-housing-and-urban-research-institute Albanese, A. (2013b, May 22) Budget boon for state's big future. The Courier-Mail, 21. Albanese, A. (2013c, December 10) Infrastructure Australia Amendment Bill 2013 – Second Reading. Retrieved April 3, 2014, from Anthony Albanese: http://anthonyalbanese.com.au/infrastructure-australia-amendment-bill-2013second-reading Albrechts, A., Alden, J., & Pires, A. (2001) The Changing Institutional Landscape of Planning. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company. Albrechts, L. (2006) Bridge the Gap: From Spatial Planning to Strategic Projects. European Planning Studies, 14 (10), 1488-1500. Albrechts, L. (2004) Strategic (spatial) planning reexamined. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 31, 743-758. 17 Asset plan will boost company tax: Cormann (2014, March 30) Retrieved April 5, 2014, from: http://www.news.com.au/national/breaking-news/asset-plan-will-boost-company-tax-cormann/story-e6frfku91226868901649 Australian Treasury (2007) Economic Roundup Summer 2007: Australia’s infrastructure policy and the COAG National Reform Agenda. Retrieved March 20, 2014, from Australian Treasury: http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1221/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=02_NRA.asp Bache, I. (2003) Governing through governance: education policy control under New Labour. Political Studies (51), 300–314. Balogh, S. (2009, May 13) Swan does a lot of give and take – Everyone asked to pitch in. The Courier-Mail, 2-3. Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society. London: Sage. Bevir, M. (2011) Interpretive Theory. in M. Bevir, The SAGE Handbook of Governance, London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 51-65. Bliemer, M., Standen, C., Currie, G., Green, J., & O'Neill, P. (2014, May 13) Federal budget 2014: infrastructure experts react. Retrieved May 14, 2014, from The Conversation: http://theconversation.com/federal-budget-2014infrastructure-experts-react-26575 Bochenski, N. (2013, November 19) Bus and rail tunnel all show and no substance: transport expert. Retrieved April 5, 2014, from The Brisbane Times: http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/bus-and-rail-tunnel-all-showand-no-substance-transport-expert-20131118-2xrab.html Brisbane City Council (BCC) (2013) Suburbs 2 City: A better run for buses. Brisbane: Brisbane City Council. Brisbane City Council (BCC) (2014, February) Draft New City Plan. Retrieved March 20, 2014, from Brisbane City Council: http://eplan.brisbane.qld.gov.au/index.htm Budget 2002 Forecast. (2002, May 14) The Courier-Mail, 2. Bunker, R., & Searle, G. (2009) Theory and Practice in Metropolitan Strategy: Situating Recent Australian Planning. Urban Policy and Research 27 (2), 101-116. Business Council of Australia (2013, December) Submission to the Productivity Commission Review of Public Infrastructure. Retrieved March 20, 2014, from Productivity Commission: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/131615/sub039-infrastructure.pdf Business SA (2013, December 20) Correspondence to Productivity Commission. Retrieved March 20, 2014, from Productivity Commission: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/131568/sub031-infrastructure.pdf Cabinet Office, HM Government (2011) Unlocking growth in cities. London: HM Government. Caldwell, A., & Ironside, R. (2012, July 14) ‘River rail in line for federal funding’. The Courier-Mail, 18. Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. COAG Communique. (2013, December 13) Retrieved March 20, 2014, from COAG: https://www.coag.gov.au/node/516 Colebatch, T. (2012, July 17) Here's a way to get $700bn of infrastructure we need. Retrieved April 5, 2014 from The Sydney Morning Herald: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/heres-a-way-to-get-700bn-ofinfrastructure-we-need-20120716-226gi.html#ixzz326X48kvI Committee for Melbourne (2013, December 19) Submission from the Committee for Melbourne. Retrieved March 20, 2014, from Productivity Commission: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/131567/sub030infrastructure.pdf Commonwealth of Australia (2009) Nation building infrastructure for productivity and prosperity. Retrieved December 5, 2013, from 2009-2010 Commonwealth Budget: http://www.budget.gov.au/200910/content/glossy/infrastructure/html/infrastructure_overview_01.htm Commonwealth of Australia (2011) Our Cities, Our Future: A national urban policy for a productive, sustainable and liveable future. Canberra: Department of Infrastructure and Transport. Consult Australia (2013, December 19) Correspondence to the Productivity Commission. Retrieved March 20, 2014, from Productivity Commission: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/131550/sub023infrastructure.pdf Coombs, G., & Roberts, C. (2007) Trends in Infrastructure. Retrieved December 2, 2013, from Australian Government: The Treasury: http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1221/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=01_public_infra.asp Davidson, K. (2010, November 30) Labor's loss is explained by the rail politic. Retrieved April 19, 2014, from The Sydney Morning Herald: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/labors-loss-is-explained-by-therail-politic-20101129-18dwp.html Davidson, K., & Venning, J. (2011) Sustainability decision-making frameworks and the application of systems thinking: an urban context. Local Environment, 16 (3), 213–228. de Roo, G., & Porter, G. (2007) Fuzzy Planning: The Role of Actors in a Fuzzy Governance Environment. London: Ashgate. de Roo, G., Hillier, J., & Van Wezemael, J. (2012) Complexity and Planning: Systems, Assemblages and Simulations. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (2002, May 14) Press Release: Gold Coast Light Rail Feasibility Study. Retrieved April 10, 2014, from Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development: http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/department/statements/2002_2003/media/a13_budget_02.aspx Department of State Development, Infrastructure & Planning (DSDIP) (2014a) Governing for Growth: Economic Strategy and Action Plan – February 2014. Brisbane: State of Queensland. Department of State Development, Infrastructure & Planning (DSDIP) (2013) Infrastructure for Economic Development. Brisbane: Government of Queensland. Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning (DSDIP) (2014b, April 2) Planning Reform. Retrieved April 4, 2014, from Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning: http://www.dsdip.qld.gov.au/about-planning/planning-reform.html 18 Department of Transport and Main Roads (2011) Connecting SEQ 2031 – An Integrated Regional Transport Plan for South East Queensland. Brisbane: Queensland Government. Department of Transport & Main Roads (2014, January 17) Underground Bus and Train. Retrieved January 25, 2014, from Department of Transport & Main Roads: http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/ubat Department of Transport and Main Roads (2014, March-April) BaT Project, Newsletter. Brisbane: Department of Transport and Main Roads. Department of Transport and Main Roads (2012) ‘Gold Coast Rapid Transit project’. Retrieved April 2, 2014, from Gold Coast Rapid Transit: Lessons Learned: http://gcrtlessonslearned.com.au/about/ Dodson, J. (2013, November) ‘Federal policy for Australia's cities: The 2011 National Urban Policy in historical and comparative perspective’. Retrieved January 12, 2013, from State of Australian Cities Conference: http://www.soacconference.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Dodson-Governance.pdf Dodson, J. (2009) ‘The 'Infrastructure Turn' in Australian Metropolitan Spatial Planning’. International Planning Studies, 14 (2), 109-123. Eddington, R. (2013, July 2) ‘Building bridges over the infrastructure gap’. The Australian Financial Review, 47. Eggers, W. (2008) ‘The changing nature of government: network governance’. In J. O’Flynn, & J. Wanna, Collaborative Governance: A new era of public policy in Australia? Canberra: ANU E Press, 23-28. Emerson, S. (2013, May 20) Budget puts federal projects closer to the too-hard basket. The Courier-Mail, 18. Emerson, S. (2014, April 2) Press Release: Innovative BaT project briefing. Retrieved April 2, 2014, from The Queensland Cabinet and Ministerial Directory: http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2014/4/2/innovative-batproject-briefing Ericson, M. (2008) ‘Infrastructure and the Vision Thing’. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67 (4), 405– 418. Fels, A. (2008) ‘Networked governance and collaboration to improve outcomes’. In J. O’Flynn, & J. Wanna, Collaborative Governance: A new era of public policy in Australia? Canberra: ANU E Press, xi-xiii. Fischer, F. (2003) Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices. New York: Oxford University Press. Flyvbjerg, B. (2004) Phronetic Planning Research: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections. Planning Theory & Practice, 5 (3), 283–306. Flyvbjerg, B. (2005) Policy and Planning for Large Infrastructure Projects: Problems, Causes, Cures. Washington: World Bank. Flyvbjerg, B. (1998) Rationality and Power. Democracy in Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Flyvbjerg, B. (n.d.) ‘What is Rationality? What is Power?’ Retrieved March 30, 2014, from Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University: Bent Flyvbjerg: http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/whatispower.php Flyvbjerg, B., & Richardson, T. (2002) ‘Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory’. In P. Allmendinger, & M. Tewdwr-Jones, Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Theory. London and New York: Routledge, 44-62. Flyvbjerg, B., & Sampson, S. (2001) Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flyvbjerg, B., Landman, T., & Schram, S. (2012) Real Social Science: Applied Phronesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foster, S. (2011, May 7) Coast on track with light rail. The Courier-Mail, 78. Franklin, M., & Heywood, L. (2001, March 8) Libs split over light rail funds. The Courier-Mail, 8. Gleeson, B., & Low, N. (2000) Australian urban planning: New challenges, new agendas. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Gleeson, B., & Steele, W. (2009) The Bellwether Zone? Planning Infrastructure in South-East Queensland. Retrieved March 9, 2014, from Griffith University: http://researchhub.griffith.edu.au/display/n13fb08b2b1156f3c6c578f8931437e9f Gleeson, B., Dodson, J., & Sipe, N. (2010) Metropolitan governance for the Australian city: The case for reform. Brisbane: Urban Research Program Griffith University. Gleeson, B., Dong, J., & Low, N. (2007) Urban Infrastructure. In S. Thompson, Planning Australia: An overview of urban and regional planning. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 309-328. Glover, R. (2013) The CRC’s future: driver or passenger? A report to the COAG Reform Council. Canberra: COAG Reform Council. Gold Coast City Council (GCCC) (2013) Gold Coast City Transport Strategy 2031. Gold Coast: Gold Coast City Council. Gold Coast City Council (GCCC) (2011) Gold Coast Rapid Transit: Repositioning the City, Corridor Study. Gold Coast: Gold Coast City Council. GoldlinQ (2012) Gold Coast light rail – Fact Sheet. Gold Coast: GoldlinQ. Graham, S. (2000) ‘Introduction: Cities and Infrastructure Networks’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24 (1), 114-119. Graham, S., & Marvin, S. (2001) Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition. London: Routledge. Grindle, M. (2012) ‘Good Governance: The Inflation of an Idea’. In B. Sanyal, L. Vale, & C. Rosan, Planning Ideas That Matter: Livability, Territoriality, Governance and Reflective Practice. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 259282. Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston: Beacon Press. Hajer, M. (2003) ‘Policy without polity? Policy analysis and the institutional void’. Policy Sciences, 36, 175-195. Hajer, M., & Wagenaar, H. (2003). Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society. New York: Cambridge University Press. 19 Hale, C. (2009, June 29) Coast on the right tracks. The Courier-Mail, 22. Hale, C. (2011, October 28) Get on board Cross River Rail project to give city a brighter future. The Courier-Mail, 44. Hale, C. (2012, February 20) Melbourne shows how Brisbane can embrace the Cross River project. The Courier-Mail, 22. Hale, C. (2010, March 26) We must stay on track. The Courier-Mail, 40. Hall, S. (1997) Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. London: Sage. Healey, P. (1997) Collaborative planning: shaping places in fragmented societies. London: Macmillan. Healey, P. (2009) In Search of the “Strategic” in Spatial Strategy Making. Planning Theory & Practice, 10 (4), 439457. Healey, P. (2010) Making Better Places: The Planning Project in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Healey, P. (2003) Planning in Relational Time and Space: Responding to New Urban Realities. In G. Bridge, & S. Watson, A Companion to the City. Oxford: Blackwell, 517-530. Healey, P. (2007) ‘Re-thinking Key Dimensions of Strategic Spatial Planning: Sustainability and Complexity’. In G. de Roo, & G. Porter, Fuzzy Planning: The Role of Actors in a Fuzzy Governance Environment. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 21-42. Healey, P. (2006) Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies: a relational planning for our times. London: Routledge. Hillier, J. (2012) ‘Baroque Complexity: If Things were Simple, Word Would Have Gotten Round. In G. de Roo, J. Hillier, & J. Van Wezemael, Complexity and Planning: Systems, Assemblages and Simulations. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 37-73. Hillier, J. (2007) Stretching Beyond the Horizon: A Multiplanar Theory of Spatial Planning and Governance. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Hockey hits at levels of debt – Opposition slams 'reckless spending' (2009, May 13) The Courier-Mail, 4. Hulten, C., & Schwab, R. (1997) A fiscal federalism approach to infrastructure policy. Regional Science and Urban Economics (27), 139-159. Hunt, G. (2013) Planning for the Future of our Cities and the Coalition Government's Plan to Repeal the Carbon Tax and Tackle Climate Change. State of Australian Cities Conference. Sydney: State of Australian Cities Conference. Infrastructure Australia (2013) Better Infrastructure Decision: Guidelines for making submissions to Infrastructure Australia's planning process, through Infrastructure Australia's Reform and Investment Framework. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. Ironside, R. (2011a, December 6) Council push plans to drive buses out of CBD. The Courier-Mail, 14. Ironside, R. (2011b, December 7) Critics dig in over BCC bus tunnel plan. The Courier-Mail, 13. Ironside, R. (2012a, June 20) Cross River Rail II at half the price. The Courier-Mail, 2. Ironside, R. (2013a, April 5) Cross River Rail in doubt. The Courier-Mail, 3. Ironside, R. (2013b, April 5) Opposition leader Tony Abbott backtracks on 2010 election promise taking Brisbane cross river rail off list. Retrieved January 20, 2014, from The Courier-Mail: http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/opposition-leader-tony-abbott-backtracks-on-2010-electionpromise-taking-brisbane-cross-river-rail-off-list/story-e6freoof-1226612810700 Ironside, R. (2013c, September 9) Premier calls for action on jobs, roads and rail. The Courier-Mail, 4. Ironside, R. (2012b, May 16) River rail goes on fast track to avoid disaster. The Courier-Mail, 2. Ironside, R. (2013d, May 23) River rail link crossed off by Premier. The Courier-Mail, 10. Ironside, R. (2013e, January 28) Signals get crossed on River Rail. The Courier-Mail, 13. Ironside, R., & Fraser, K. (2013, May 18) Funding stoush threatens to derail 'vital' $5b Cross River Rail project. The Courier-Mail, 7. Ironside, R., & MacDonald, R. (2013, May 16) Private sector keen on rail job. The Courier-Mail, 13. Johnstone, C. (2010, April 23) Mayors push Bligh to spend up big. The Courier Mail, p. 26. Jones, C. (2001, June 20) Coast gets its share of the gold. The Courier-Mail, p. 17. Jørgensen, M., & Phillips, L. (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. London: Sage Publications Ltd. Kearns, A., & Paddison, R. (2000) New Challenges for Urban Governance. Urban Studies, 37 (5-6), 845-850. Keast, R., Mandell, M., Brown, K., & Woolcock, G. (2005) Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations. Public Administration Review, 64 (3), 363-371. Keen, L. (2013, July 3) 'Priority projects' list released. The Australian Financial Review, 11. Kerkin, K. (2004) Discourse, Representation and Urban Planning: how a critical approach to discourse helps reveal the spatial re-ordering of street sex work. Australian Geographer, 35 (2), 185–192. Kickert, W., Klijn, E., & Koppenjan, J. (1997) Public Management and Network Management. In W. Kickert, & J. Koppenjan, Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector. London: Sage, 35-61. Kirkeby, O. (2009) Phronesis as the Sense of the Event. International Journal of Action Research, 5 (1), 68-113. Kooimann, J. (2000) Societal governance: levels, modes and orders of social – political interaction. In J. Pierre, Debating Governance. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 138-166. Laffin, M., Mawson, J., & Ormston, C. (2013) Public services in a ‘postdemocratic age: an alternative framework to network governance’. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 31, 1-15. Landmann, T. (2012) Phronesis and Narrative Analysis. In B. Flyvbjerg, T. Landman, & S. Schram, Real Social Science: Applied Phronesis. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 27-45. Lasswell, H. (1936) Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Whittlesey House. Latour, B. (2005) Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. MacDonald, R. (2012, April 2) Future of billion-dollar rail fix project hangs by political thread. The Courier-Mail, 18. MacDonald, R. (2013, May 31) Politics a slow journey. The Courier-Mail, 5. 20 Madigan, M. (2013, May 15) Funding paves way for major projects – But private sector to help pay for river. The Courier-Mail, 4. Marks, G., & Hooghe, L. (2004) Contrasting visions of multi-level governance. In I. Bache, & M. Flinders, Multi-Level Governance: Inter-disciplinary Perspectives. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 13-30. Martens, K. (2007) Actors in a Fuzzy Governance Environment. In G. de Roo, & G. Porter, Fuzzy Planning: The Role of Actors in a Fuzzy Governance Environment. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 43-66. McFarlane, C., & Rutherford, J. (2008) Political Infrastructures: Governing and Experiencing the Fabric of the City. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32 (2), 363–374. McInerney, L., Nadarajah, C., & Perkins, F. (2006) Australia’s infrastructure policy and the COAG National Reform Agenda. Canberra: Australian Treasury. Moore, T. (2014a, April 3) Legacy Way and BaT tunnel to be linked, ending long commute from western suburbs. Retrieved April 5, 2014, from The Brisbane Times: http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/legacy-way-andbat-tunnel-to-be-linked-ending-long-commute-from-western-suburbs-20140402-35yyu.html Moore, T. (2014b, March 19) Examining where Brisbane's new BaT tunnel would run – and the cost. Retrieved April 5, 2014, from The Brisbane Times: http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/examining-where-brisbanesnew-bat-tunnel-would-run--and-the-cost-20140319-352en.html Moore, T. (2013, May 16). Private sector keen to partner on Cross River Rail. Retrieved April 10, 2014, from The Brisbane Times: http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/private-sector-keen-to-partner-on-cross-river-rail20130516-2jo0q.html Moore, T., & Stephens, K. (2013, November 21) Brisbane Underground to replace Adelaide Street bus tunnel. Retrieved April 5, 2014, from The Brisbane Times: http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/brisbaneunderground-to-replace-adelaide-street-bus-tunnel-20131120-2xvrr.html Neal, Z. (2013) The Connected City: How Networks are Shaping the Modern Metropolis. New York: Routledge. Nicolaidis, K., & Howse, R. (2001).The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. NineMSN. (2013, August 12) Abbott wants to be an 'infrastructure PM'. Retrieved January 18, 2014, from NineMSN: http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/2013/08/12/09/34/abbott-wants-to-be-an-infrastructure-pm O'Connor, M. (2010, September 20). State's plans are just full of hot air. The Courier-Mail, 24. OECD (2010) Economic Survey of Australia. Paris: OECD. Office of Economic and Statistical Research (OESR) (2014) Queensland Regional Profiles: Resident Profile – people who live in the region, Gold Coast City Local Government Area (LGA), Compared with Queensland. Brisbane: The State of Queensland (Queensland Treasury and Trade). Office of Economic and Statistical Research (OESR) (2014b) Queensland Regional Profiles: Resident Profile – people who live in the region, Brisbane Local Government Area (LGA), Compared with Queensland. Brisbane: The State of Queensland (Queensland Treasury and Trade). OMEGA Centre (2012) Mega Projects: Lessons for Decision-makers: An Analysis of Selected International Largescale Transport Infrastructure Projects. London: Bartlett School of Planning, University College London. Papadopoulos, Y. (2000) Governance, Coordination and Legitimacy in Public Policies. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24 (1), 210-223. Parag, Y. (n.d.) A System Perspective for Policy Analysis and Understanding: The Policy Process Networks. Retrieved January 15, 2014, from Environmental Change Institute: http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/publications/downloads/parag06.pdf Parnell, S. (2001a, February 9) Beattie's vow puts rail study on track. The Courier-Mail, 5. Parnell, S. (2001b, April 4) PM derails transport plans. The Courier-Mail, 1. Pierre, J. P., & Peters, G. (2005) Governing Complex Societies: Trajectories and Scenarios. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pierre, J. (2011) The Politics of Urban Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ‘Policies & promises’ (2009, March 21) The Courier-Mail, 56. ‘Politicians again heading down the wrong track’. (2010, July 29). The Courier-Mail, 34. Productivity Commission (2014) Public Infrastructure, Draft Inquiry Report. Canberra: Productivity Commission. Productivity Commission (2013) Public Infrastructure: Issues Paper. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. Queensland Government (2012a) City Building. Retrieved April 15, 2014, from Gold Coast Rapid Transit: Lessons Learned: http://gcrtlessonslearned.com.au/lessons-learned/city-building/ Queensland Government (2012b) Project Governance. Retrieved April 20, 2014, from Gold Coast Rapid Transit: Lessons Learned: http://gcrtlessonslearned.com.au/lessons-learned/project-governance/ Rabinow, P. (1991) The Foucault Reader: An introduction to Foucault’s thought. London: Penguin. ‘Rail link, busway projects top to-do list’ (2011, July 5). The Courier-Mail, 5. ‘Rail project must be top of the list’ (2010, July 8). The Courier-Mail, 30. Rhodes, R. A. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity, and Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press. Rotmans, J., Loorbach, D., & Kemp, R. (2012) ‘Complexity and Transition Management’. In G. de Roo, J. Hillier, & J. Van Wezemael, Complexity and Planning: Systems, Assemblages and Simulations. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 177-197. Rudd, K. (2008) ‘Nation-Building for Australia's Future Address to Australian Davos Connection’, Speech to Infrastructure 21 Summit, Brisbane. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. Sansom, G., Dawkins, J., & Tan, S. (May 2012) The Australian Model of Metropolitan Governance: Insights from Perth and South East Queensland. Sydney: UTS: Centre for Local Government, University of Technology, Sydney. Sanyal, B., Vale, L., & Rosan, C. (2012) Planning Ideas That Matter. Cambridge: MIT Press. Scott, S. (2013a, May 14) Labor set for family wrath. The Courier-Mail, 4. 21 Scott, S. (2013b, June 29) Rudd revives river rail. The Courier-Mail, 5. Scott, S., & Benson, S. (2013, May 16) Abbott to back Budget slashes – No Escape from Cuts. The Courier-Mail, 1. SMART Infrastructure Facility (2014) Green Paper: Infrastructure Imperatives for Australia. Wollongong: University of Wollongong. Sommerfeld, J. (2000, June 9) Gold Coast may head down trams track. The Courier-Mail, 1. Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2007) Theories of Democratic Network Governance. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Steele, W., & Gleeson, B. (2010) ‘Mind the governance gap: oil vulnerability and urban resilience in Australian cities’. Australian Planner, 47 (4), 302-310. Stilwell, F., & Troy, P. (2000) ‘Multilevel Governance and Urban Development in Australia’. Urban Studies, 37 (5-6), 909-930. Sturup, S. (2010) ‘The Art of Government of Melbourne’s City Link Project’. Retrieved March 28, 2014, from 12th Word Conference of Transport Research: http://www.vref.se/download/18.53e8780912f2dbbe3a580003535/ Talcott, P., & Weber, M. (1997) Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Free Press: New York. Time to act on infrastructure (2013, June 14) The Courier-Mail, 32. Tingle, L. (2013, June 8) ‘Australia expects: Abbott cautions’. The Australian Financial Review, 15. Torfing, J. (2007) ‘Introduction: Democratic Network Governance’. In E. Sørensen, & J. Torfing, Theories of Democratic Network Governance. Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan. 1-22. Turner, P. (2003) ‘Light Rail Down Under: Three Strikes and You’re Not Out!’, Circular: 9th National Light Rail Transit Conference (pp. 745-762). Portland: Transportation Research Board. Vogler, S. (2011, March 19) Bid to derail Cross River for subway. The Courier-Mail, 20. Vogler, S. (2012a, January 14) Cut-price river rail explored. The Courier-Mail, 25. Vogler, S. (2012b, January 17) Plan puts QR off track as only rail provider. The Courier-Mail, p. 10. Voogd, H., & Woltjer, J. (2007) From Government to Governance: Actor Participation in Regional Planning. In G. de Roo, & G. Porter, Fuzzy Planning: The Role of Actors in a Fuzzy Governance Environment. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 67-83. Wardill, S., McCarthy, J., & Vogler, S. (2011, January 28) Infrastructure protected from pared-back budget. The Courier-Mail, 5. Wear, R. (2014, March 31) Hockey’s asset sales sweetener could shift Queensland thinkin’. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from The Conversation: http://theconversation.com/hockeys-asset-sales-sweetener-could-shift-queenslandthinking-23654 Wellman, K., & Spiller, M. (2012) Urban infrastructure: finance and management. West Sussex: Wiley & Sons Ltd. Wiggins, J. (2013, May 23) Blueprint for the future. The Australian Financial Review, 52. Wiggins, J. (2014, January 28) COAG Control, trust keys to way forward. The Australian Financial Review, 9. Yanow, D. (2000) Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. APPENDIX A. Appendix 1: Detailed case studies These detailed case studies of GCRT (Fig. 2) and BaT Tunnel (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5) were prepared as narratives of the intergovernmental relations and decision-making processes with a view to revealing the interrelational, contingent, performative and intentional nature of deliberation. The two public transport projects share several commonalities including: • • • • • • • • • • • Delivery of system and service improvements that address congestion and productivity issues An emphasis on urban experience and service provision: ‘turn up and go’ Location in urbanised areas Intention to catalyse economic development and urban renewal in urbanised and urbanising areas including transit oriented development and compact development. That is the projects are the basis for sociotechnological and spatial re-ordering. Significant transformations of urban socio-technological networks and potential unbundling of those networks through privatisation (Graham & Marvin 2001) Involvement of multiple levels of government in decision-making Responsiveness in part or whole to local government initiatives Inclusion in SEQ statutory regional and transport plans and local planning schemes i.e. these initiatives are not just ‘major projects’ but part of integrated systems and plans and are outcome oriented Being deemed as projects of national significance and of high priority by IA Significant media commentary Reflection of place identities of each city, positioning to become competitive global cities with the Gold Coast as a world class event and tourist destination and Brisbane as a “new world city”. A.1. Case study 1: Gold Coast Rapid Transit A.1.1. Project description The GCRT project, also referred to as the light rail project, will see the development of light rail comprised of a 13km line linking key centres and 16 stations from Griffith University – Gold Coast to Broadbeach, travelling via Southport and other commercial hubs. It will service the Gold Coast University Hospital and medical precincts. The project is Queensland’s first light rail project and has been described as “a city building project to support sustainable development on the Gold Coast” (GoldlinQ 2012). The Gold Coast City Transport Strategy 2031 proposes subsequent stages of the light rail line, including linkage to the heavy rail line at Helensvale and continuation to Coolangatta, extending the line to 40 km (GCCC 2013). 22 A.1.2. Urban context The Gold Coast is located in the SEQ region and is one of Australia’s fastest growing urbanised areas. Drawing on Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data, the Office of Economic and Statistical Research (OESR) (2014a:3) reports 2 that the Gold Coast City Council (GCCC) footprint measures 1,333.7 km . The resident population of the LGA was 2 estimated at 537,844 persons as of 30 June 2013, meaning that population density is 403.3 persons per km (2014a:5). With an annual average growth rate of 2.2 percent over five years and 2.7 percent over 10 years, the city is growing at a faster rather than the average for Queensland being two percent over five years and 2.2 percent over 10 years (p. 5). The OESR has projected population growth for the Gold Coast of 2.3 percent per year or a total of 905,681 persons over the 25 years to 2036. This is higher than for Queensland, which will experience a projected average of 1.9 percent per year for the same period (2014a:10). Gold Coast City is described in its planning scheme as “a linear city with no single dominant centre and a strong alignment with the coastline and the Pacific Motorway. Less than 25% of the City's area is properly defined as urban (GCCC 2003).” The urban area, with the greatest intensity of development, is located along the coastline between Coolangatta and Paradise Point. This area includes major centres and tourist destinations such as Surfers Paradise and Southport as well as important activity nodes. A combination of sprawl and urban hubs, together with lack of walkability and pedestrian amenity in some areas, resulted in high car dependence and traffic congestion. Gold Coast planning must also address the provisions of the SEQRP, as a statutory document setting out the land use principles and outcomes for the greater region. A.1.3. Intergovernmental relations The 1997 Integrated Regional Transport Plan for South East Queensland proposed increasing public transport on the Gold Coast including a public transport corridor. The GCCC followed with its own Integrated Transport Plan. The 1998 Line Haul Public Transport Foundation and Feasibility Study, undertaken jointly by the State Government and Gold Coast City Council, emphasised light rail/rapid transit as part of a significant transit network development (Department of Transport and Main Roads 2012). The 30-year plan identified the need for more than $2 billion for transport infrastructure over a 15 year period (Sommerfeld 2000:1). Subsequent feasibility studies were funded by State Government, under Premier Peter Beattie, and the Premier and the Gold Coast Mayor Gary Baildon were in discussions with the Federal Government, under Prime Minister John Howard, in 2000 to secure further funding (Parnell 2001a:5). GCRT was raised, in part, due to a proposal to reallocate Centenary of Federation funds from Brisbane to the Gold Coast after studies revealed light rail in Brisbane was not feasible (Franklin and Heywood 2001:8). Prime Minister Howard was involved in the negotiations, which also included senior public servants such as the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department and the Director-General of the Premier's Department, pledging to raise the issue with Cabinet. Prime Minister Howard also toured the proposed route in March 2001 – eventually the funds were allocated to projects in Liberal held seats (Parnell 2001a:1). The Federal Government and Prime Minister were accused of ‘politically motivated funding decisions’ and ‘pork barrelling’ by Premier Beattie in the lead up to a Federal election in 2001 (Parnell 2001a:1). Other stakeholders weighed in with the Property Council of Australia’s Executive Director Ross Elliott observing that "[the funding is] part of a long history of allocating funding in marginal seats when there is an election coming up”. At this time, Elliott also argued for the development of a national infrastructure strategy, saying that "[s]uch a strategy is the only way funding decisions can be removed from the political arena and allocated to those areas of greatest need”. State Government budgeted funds for a study in 2001 (Jones 2001:17). Tenders were called for the feasibility study in June 2001 with the study completed in 2004 as a joint initiative of State and Local Government. The Federal Government budgeted matched funds in 2002 (‘Budget 2002 Forecast’ 2002:2) on the understanding that further financial support to the project would be decided after the study was completed. At the time the Deputy Prime Minister, John Anderson, said that, "[t]he Gold Coast light rail project normally would be the responsibility of the state and local governments. We are supporting the feasibility study because of the scale of the project and its potential impact on the region (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development 2002).” From 2004 until 2009, when the business case was finalised, additional studies and planning were undertaken by the State Government. However, there was considerable disagreement in the GCCC with then Mayor Ron Clark opposing the project principally on the grounds of cost and all other Councillors supporting it. While rapid transit was supported and recommended, there was division about the mode – light rail or bus. Despite some vacillation by the State Government due to Council conflict, a Memorandum of Understanding between State and Local Government was signed in 2006. The Gold Coast Rapid Transit project was included in the SEQIPP with a significant funding commitment, triggering approval to proceed to planning phase by State Cabinet. There was, and continues to be, stakeholder engagement in the development of design concepts, impact management plan and business case. By 2008, a preliminary business case supported the project with recommendations for Stage One, and GCCC committed funds. In relation to the GCRT, Turner (2003:760-761) observes that institutional factors often take priority with “political decisions [taking] center stage when transport decisions are being made”. From a policy perspective, the light rail was developed as a response to a range of policy needs and local problems with broader impacts including congestion, sustainability, economic development and tourism industry development, with each level of government seeking to have their needs addressed. With COAG having endorsed national PPP guidelines, all three levels of government also sought to develop a demonstration project which “would meet the desires of the market for a large Public Private Partnership (PPP)” (Department of Transport and Main Roads 2012). The Federal Government would guarantee private debt on the understanding that the availability PPP model was regarded as a highly effective 23 way of accessing private financing for large public infrastructure projects. Infrastructure was positioned in the government’s agenda as a mechanism for weathering the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the economic uncertainty that followed. In 2009, IA declared the project a priority and ‘ready to proceed’, triggering an allocation of funding in one of the first projects to be approved by that recently established government body. Leading up to the 2009 State Government election, Labor promised to complete the first two stages of the GCRT project from Parklands to Broadbeach by 2013 (‘Policies & promises’ 2009:56). Having been included in the National Infrastructure Priority List, the Federal Government budgeted $365 million to the project (Balogh 2009:3), representing more than 40 percent of its cost. The commitment was applauded by industry stakeholders such as Infrastructure Partnerships Australia Executive Director Brendan Lyon who said “[c]ongestion across Australia's cities is one of the most significant challenges facing Australia's governments ... That's why the Budget's focus on investing in new urban passenger transport like the Gold Coast light rail ... is particularly welcome” (‘Hockey hits at levels of debt - Opposition slams 'reckless spending' 2009:4). Additional studies were also undertaken including a review of the Gold Coast’s planning scheme and corridor studies (GCCC 2011:11). The documentation of Lessons Learned from the project includes detailed accounts of the governance process from inception to business case preparation to procurement. In particular, the need for responsiveness to the objectives of the key funders, including changes to project scope and structure, was stressed. For example, the Federal Government funding was dependent “on the project’s City Building objectives and government’s strong interest in realising significant land and economic development opportunities through the Stage One corridor” (Queensland Government 2012). The project was described by Hale (‘Coast on the right tracks’ 2009:22) as “a visionary exercise that will transform the Gold Coast from an overgrown seaside suburb into a true city – with all the status and opportunities that cities offer”. Procurement stage proceeded with ongoing funding commitments from all levels of government and the commencement of State Government funded works prior to seeking bids from operators under a public-private partnership (PPP). The State Government announced the GoldlinQ consortium as the successful bidder to build and operate the light rail in May 2011, after a year of deliberations (Foster 2011:78). With trials having been completed, services are due to commence in June 2014. This case study reflects changes about the role of government and governance dynamics in relation to infrastructure, including the role of Federal Government in funding catalyst public/passenger transport. Particular emphasis was placed on the leadership role played by the GCCC which was instrumental in securing the partnership between all levels of government (Queensland Government 2012). The project took shape and was delivered during a time of significant policy and institutional reform, including the development of the nation’s first infrastructure framework and urban policy which emphasised productivity, sustainability and liveability. While the project was led by the GCCC, it is reported as the first public transport initiative involving all three levels of government in a collaborative funding and governance arrangement. A.2. Case study 2: BaT Tunnel A.2.1. Project description Brisbane BaT (Bus and Train) Tunnel replaces the CRR initiative (Fig. 3) after several years of studies and negotiations. Both the Bligh State Government and the Gillard Federal Government had committed to the CRR which was comprised of an 18 km north-south rail line in Brisbane's inner city, including underground lines. As Queensland’s largest ever infrastructure project, it would add passenger and freight train services with additional lines and four stations between Salisbury and Bowen Hills through Brisbane's CBD. The CRR proposal was made public in 2009, attracting much media attention and commentary. In 2010, the State Government released Connecting SEQ 2031 – An Integrated Regional Transport Plan for South East Queensland, in which the CRR was listed as an integral element of enhanced transport systems and service provision. The Bligh Government was replaced by the Liberal/National Party (LNP) Government led by Campbell Newman in March 2012. The CRR project saw significant conflict between the Premier and the Federal Government, with the Federal Opposition taking a negative view towards future funding despite IA having recognised it as a nationally significant project. With the election of the Abbott Government, support for the project was withdrawn by the Federal Government which made an election promise to develop additional freight rail lines to the port. The Newman Government redeveloped the project as the Underground Bus and Train (UBAT) project, announcing it in November 2013. Incorporating recommendations from the BCC’s Suburbs 2 City bus project, the project was renamed the BaT Tunnel in March 2014 and addresses a need for additional commuter rail and bus services and enhanced networks. The Department of Main Roads and Transport (n.d.) describes the project as a “5km north-south tunnel that will deliver rail and bus together in a worldfirst design. It combines a railway and a busway in a single, double-decked, 15m-wide tunnel beneath the Brisbane River and Brisbane’s central business district”. A.2.2. Urban context As the capital of Queensland, Brisbane is located in the conurbation of South East Queensland. The city has developed a place brand as “Australia’s New World City” with a view to positioning itself as a globally competitive 2 metropolis strongly linked in the Asia Pacific region. The Brisbane City LGA footprint is 1,340.3 km . Based on ABS data, OESR (2014b) estimates that the resident population of the LGA as at 20 June 2013 was 1,131,191 persons. 2 Population density is 843.98 persons per km . Brisbane’s population growth rate is slower than Queensland as a whole with annual average growth of 1.8 percent over five years and 2.0 percent over 10 years. The average for Queensland was 2.0 percent over five years and 2.2 percent over 10 years. While LGAs adjacent to Brisbane in SEQ are experiencing more rapid growth than Brisbane, the city is experiencing pressures from that regional growth. As the major employment and economic hub in the region, there is demand on a range of services and infrastructure that are not exclusively attributable to LGA resident demand and access. The OESR projects population growth to 30 24 June 2036 at 1,440,223 persons, an increase of 1.1 percent per year to 2036. This is lower than for Queensland, which will experience a projected average of 1.9 percent per year for the same period. Brisbane is a highly centralised city with radial transport corridors. Earlier planning studies, such as CityShape, sought to enhance a hierarchy of centres throughout the suburban fabric and planning efforts have created “nodes and corridors radiating from the city centre” (BCC, 2014). According to the BCC City Plan, this has resulted in “an efficient urban form and has meant that large-scale urban change has been contained to less than 7% of Brisbane” (BCC, 2014). Significant change in the inner urban core has resulted in higher and varying densities and mixed uses. The City Plan accommodates principles of smart growth, sustainable development and transit oriented development as part of this urban restructuring. Significant transport behaviour change is also sought as part of the Plan through active transport and higher public transport use. The city has undertaken several feasibility studies for light rail that have shown the concept to be unviable (Turner 2003). Consequently, the city has experienced significant constraints in the development of transport networks as well as promoting public transport uptake. Brisbane City planning must also address the provisions of the SEQRP, as a statutory document setting out the land use principles and outcomes for the greater region. A.2.3. Intergovernmental relations The 2008 Inner City Rail Capacity Study, commissioned by the State Government, found that an additional rail crossing was required to link the north and south sides of the river, as rail capacity would be reached by 2016. As a State Government project, the CRR did not require significant funding from the BCC but would require Council involvement. However, it was reliant on the Federal Government, which provided funds for the feasibility study commenced in 2009, with the project having been identified as having potential by IA. During this period, there was regular commentary in the media expressing anxiety about and the need for the project, with calls for intergovernmental cooperation in the face of a looming deadline. For example, Hale stated “[t]aking a leap forward through our cross-river rail project ... only appears possible by combining the efforts of federal, state and local governments” (‘We must stay on track’ 2010). Other editorial comment expressed concern about timeframes and urgency due to an impending transport crisis resulting from capacity issues. The cross river link was considered vital for ensuring full benefits and effectiveness of other rail network upgrades. Based on economic growth forecasts, Access Economics called on the State Government “to commit large amounts of funding immediately to the region's next big building project, the $14 billion CRR upgrade” (Johnstone 2010). Then Brisbane Lord Mayor, Campbell Newman, admitted CRR should be a greater priority for Commonwealth funding than Council proposed projects (‘Rail project must be top of the list’ 2010) with The Courier Mail reporting “Cross River Rail is the region's major new infrastructure priority” (‘Politicians again heading down the wrong track’ 2010). Despite widespread devastation as a result of natural disaster impacts, the State Government endeavoured to maintain its commitment to the CRR (Wardill, McCarthy and Vogler 2011). However, by the end of January 2011, the Premier and State Treasurer conceded to delay the project due to budgetary pressures. Cost was increasingly a consideration in deliberation and commentary about the project. By March 2011, Lord Mayor Newman was arguing for a cheaper 25-30 station subway system to replace the CRR, citing Barcelona and Paris as examples (Vogler 2011:20). By April 2011, Newman had stood down as Lord Mayor to become leader of the LNP and to run in the state election. In July 2011, IA released its list of national priorities with the CRR included as a ‘threshold’ project as it was not ready to proceed. The CRR was included in the Queensland Infrastructure Plan released in July 2011. In the lead up to the state election, with the release of the LNP’s infrastructure program, the LNP vacillated about the future of the CRR proposal, again on the grounds of cost, with Newman stating both that the project would proceed and that an alternative solution would be found. However, expert commentary hailed the CRR as “simply the best option we have to create 21st century networks of metropolitan movement from the legacy of a 19th century rail system” (Hale 2011:44). In order to address bus congestion and service issues, the LNP dominated BCC announced its Suburbs 2 City Buslink in December 2011. Council proposed an underground busway and bus-only bridge amid speculation that the unfunded CRR would not proceed (Ironside 2011:14). SEQ Council of Mayors also delivered a feasibility study to build a second rail bridge to alleviate peak capacity of the existing rail bridge (Vogler 2012a:25). There was apparent lack of intergovernmental cooperation exercised at this time, with each level of government offering preferences and alternatives. For Hale, the politicisation of the project and the complaint about its expense indicates an immature debate about the potential of generational change and long term return on investment. He claimed that “[i]ts benefits far outweigh the costs and this is precisely the sort of project an emerging major city must pursue” (Hale 2012:22). In March 2012, IA upgraded the CRR to ‘ready to proceed’ status, a sign that the project would receive funding from the Federal Government. In the lead up to the State Government election, the CRR continued to be the subject of debate with lobby groups such as the Tourism and Transport Forum and Back on Track expressing support for the initiative. While the State Government remained committed to the project, the Opposition pledged to consider more affordable alternatives. When LNP won the election in March, the future of the CRR was in doubt and. Premier Newman announced that an expert panel would review the project and devise an alternative (Ironside 2012b). A ‘budget version’ of the project was announced in 2012 with the expectation of private sector investment (Ironside 2012a:2). In naming the CRR a national priority, IA described it as ‘transformational’ (Caldwell & Ironside 2012). The newspaper reports that follow reveal a series of antagonistic communications, with the State Government demanding 80 percent of the required funding, while the Federal Government expressed support for the project based on the agreed 50-50 funding formula. As the Federal election campaign accelerated the State Government and the media pressured the Federal Government and Opposition to make clear commitments to high priority infrastructure needs. 25 The Federal Government made its commitment to the CRR in the 2013-14 Federal Budget (Scott 2013). However, while the funding allocation fell short of State Government expectations, the Federal Government was proposing private sector involvement through joint State and Federal Government backed ‘availability payments’ (Madigan 2013), an initiative supported by analysts who projected a high level of private sector interest in the project, with such arrangements having been successful elsewhere in Queensland, Sydney and Melbourne (Ironside & MacDonald 2013:13). The proposed cost of the project also escalated with an additional $1 billion required to undertake the infrastructure build (Ironside & Fraser 2013:7). Rancour between Federal and State Transport Ministers about funding arrangements continued. Under the strain of difficult fiscal arrangements including high government debt, both Albanese and Emerson published statements in The Courier-Mail. Comment addressed changes to Federal-State infrastructure funding formulas ‘hidden in the Federal budget’ (Emerson 2013:18) and stressed the greatest budget commitment to Queensland infrastructure by a Federal Government (Albanese 2013b:21). Albanese was also at pains to explain that the Federal Government provided the State Government with the deal it requested in writing. However, Premier Newman confirmed on 23 May 2013 that the CRR would not proceed and that the joint funding arrangement with the Federal Government would be rejected (Ironside 2013d:10). Coupled with cost, Abbott’s seemingly intractable stance against funding rail and public transport, on the grounds that they were not Federal Government responsibility, also left the State Government little room to move in the event of a change of government. The Premier proposed a suite of other measures to address congestion, some of which had already been funded and applied, such as improved timetabling and management practices, until an alternative could be developed. A Courier-Mail editorial described the stand-off between the State and Governments as highlighting “the fragility of our system for getting big infrastructure projects off the drawing board” (MacDonald 2013:5). In lamenting the demise of the project, MacDonald said “[m]ore than $50 million and who knows how many hours of bureaucrats' time have been spent over the past four years steering this urgently needed $5.4 billion public transport scheme to the point where all it needs to become reality is the funding and some bipartisan goodwill (2013:5)”. Despite the seeming finality of the arrangements, negotiations and lobbying about CRR funding continued. CRR was considered to be Brisbane’s most important and urgent infrastructure development, with significant funds expended and a Federal Government deal on offer. However, as The Courier-Mail editorialised: instead of progress we have a political stalemate driven by self-interested point-scoring and squabbles over the conditions attached to the federal money. It is verging on the scandalous that Federal Infrastructure Minister Anthony Albanese and State Transport Minister Scott Emerson are unable to negotiate a solution (‘Time to act on infrastructure’ 2013:32). The Courier-Mail called for a different approach to politics, policy and politicians to ensure that much needed infrastructure was delivered. In June 2013, after returning to the Prime Ministership, Kevin Rudd invited the Queensland Premier to further negotiate the CRR deal (Scott 2013:5). Despite meetings between the Prime Minister and Premier and also between the Federal and State Transport Ministers, agreement could not be reached. When the Coalition won the federal election in September 2013, the State Government claimed it would lobby for CRR funding despite Abbott’s earlier rejection of funding for rail. On 10 September 2013, the State Government pledged to build the Brisbane Underground, a bus and rail transport tunnel beneath the Brisbane River. While it was proposed that the project would cost significantly less than the original CRR initiative, its scale was also significantly reduced with fewer stations proposed. Joint Federal-State funding arrangements for other infrastructure would see the Federal Government contributing more funds to Queensland road infrastructure on an 80-20 basis. Consequently, funds would be available for the Brisbane Underground. The Brisbane City Centre Masterplan, prepared by BCC, was released in September 2013 and includes the underground rail and bus services. The first plans for the Brisbane Underground were released in November 2013 showing a two level tunnel from Dutton Park to Bowen Hills with three centrally located stations. Known as Underground Bus and Train (UBAT), the proposal blends the State Government’s CRR and BCC’s Suburbs 2 City (BCC, 2013) projects to achieve a multimodal underground transit corridor. The State Government is funding the UBAT project with possible contributions from BCC and likely private sector involvement. The project, renamed the BaT (Bus and Train Tunnel) in April 2014, will be completed in 2020 and work will commence in 2015 (Moore & Stephens, 2013). The bus tunnel will also link to another tunnel project, Legacy Way, to enable rapid transit for buses across the city (Moore R. , 2014). For some, the reconfiguration of the project is regarded as an innovation (Moore 2014b). However, Hale describes the BaT Tunnel as a ‘stunt’ that reflects outdated ideas about transport planning rather than enabling a paradigm or cultural shift from road and bus to train (Bochenski 2013). He argues that the planning principles that informed the CRR have been undermined and that resources are best directed to enhancing train rather than bus networks. Infrastructure funding incentives announced by the Federal Government may mean the project attracts Commonwealth funding. By selling assets to fund productive infrastructure, States are eligible for additional funding. According to the Premier “[the] asset sale incentive ... would allow the state to apply for federal funding to help pay for the $5 billion BaT tunnel” (Moore 2014a). The State Government released preliminary plans for the BaT Tunnel in April 2014 with ongoing refinement and business case preparation underway. Seemingly, the Premier has personally taken carriage of the project. A project team, rather than a steering body, has been established and involves representatives from several government departments, including Treasury, BCC and the private sector as well as industry experts. The Federal and State Treasurers are ‘talking’ and PPP arrangements, such as those used for the GCRT project, are under consideration (Moore 2014b). Industry briefings have also been undertaken and the State Government is seeking “innovative ideas 26 from the private sector ... on key elements including depth of the stations and how the project will be built and operated” (Emerson 2013:18). A network is emerging around this project that has both horizontal and vertical scope, but it is unclear whether it is intended for governance. This case study, like the GCRT project, reflects a shifting discourse about the role of government and governance dynamics in relation to infrastructure. The CRR/BaT Tunnel project took shape and was delivered during a time of significant policy and political change, including both State and Federal Governments, which has resulted in political antagonism and policy reform. 27

RELATED PAPERS

RELATED TOPICS

Log In

Infrastructure governance: a policy and discourse analysis of intergovernmental relations in two major infrastructure projects in South East Queensland (Masters Thesis)

Infrastructure governance: a policy and discourse analysis of intergovernmental relations in two major infrastructure projects in South East Queensland (Masters Thesis)

Related Papers

RELATED PAPERS

RELATED TOPICS