Need for Cognition and the process of lie detection

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Abstract

Four experiments investigated the influence of Need for Cognition on the process of lie detection. According to the basic assumptions of dual process models, only higher Need for Cognition leads to the use of verbal information when making judgments of veracity. People with lower Need for Cognition predominantly use stereotypical nonverbal information for their judgments. In both Experiments 1 and 2, participants saw a film in which nonverbal cues (fidgety vs. calm movements) and verbal cues (low vs. high plausibility) were manipulated. As predicted, when Need for Cognition was lower, only the nonverbal cues influenced participants' judgments of veracity. In contrast, participants with higher Need for Cognition also used the verbal cues. Experiments 3 and 4 tested the hypothesis that higher Need for Cognition leads to better discrimination of truthful from deceptive messages. Both experiments found that participants with higher Need for Cognition achieved higher accuracy at classifying truthful and deceptive messages than participants with lower Need for Cognition.

Section snippets

The process of lie detection

While a number of theories have been developed to explain why people may behave differently when they are lying as opposed to telling the truth (e.g., Buller & Burgoon, 1996, DePaulo et al., 2003, Ekman, 1992, Ekman & Friesen, 1969, Sporer, 2004, Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, Sporer & Schwandt, 2007, Vrij, 2000, Zuckerman & Driver, 1985; Zuckerman et al., 1981), the process of lie detection by laypersons has received little attention until most recently (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, Forrest & Feldman, 2000

The present research

As stated above, the degree of cognitive effort individuals are willing or able to invest in the process of credibility attribution may depend on situational variables (such as distraction or situational relevance) and on dispositional differences in cognitive motivation (e.g., NFC). NFC was found to be an essential variable in dual process models to explain the formation of attitude judgments (cf., Cacioppo et al., 1983, Cacioppo et al., 1996, Priester & Petty, 1995).

The aim of this paper is

Participants

Ninety-four female and 66 male students at the University of Giessen (mean age = 23.3) participated for departmental credit.

Design

The design was a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, with verbal information (truthful cues vs. deceptive cues) and nonverbal information (truthful cues vs. deceptive cues); 40 participants were randomly assigned to each of the four cells in the design.

Stimulus material

Four parallel versions of a short film (2 min long) about a conversation between a woman (Anna) looking for a successor to take over

Participants

One hundred twenty-four female and 124 male students at the University of Giessen (mean age = 23.9) participated as volunteers in partial fulfilment of departmental requirements. The study lasted 20 min.

Design

The design was a 2 × 2 × 2 between-participants design, with verbal information (truthful cues vs. deceptive cues), nonverbal information (truthful cues vs. deceptive cues), and participants’ cognitive load (low vs. high) completely crossed. Thirty-one participants were randomly assigned to each of the

Participants

Fifty female and 48 male students at the University of Mannheim (mean age = 23.0) participated as volunteers in partial fulfilment of departmental requirements. The study lasted 20 min.

Design

The design was a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-model design. Sex of participants was a between-participants factor, and type of message (truthful vs. deceptive), valence of attitude (like vs. dislike), and sex of targets were within-participants factors. Valence of attitude, sex of participants, and sex of targets were included as

Participants

Thirty female and 57 male students at the University of Mannheim (mean age = 24.7) participated as volunteers in partial fulfilment of departmental requirements. The study lasted 40 min.

Design

The design was a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-model design. Sex of participants was a between-participants factors, and type of message (truthful vs. deceptive) and sex of targets were within-participants factors. Both sex of participants and sex of targets were included as control factors but were not expected to influence the

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      By referring to dual process models of persuasion highlighting the role of motivation and resources in message processing (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999), recent research on deception detection found that high accuracy motivation and high processing resources foster systematic attention to the content of the message (cf. Forrest & Feldman, 2000). Consequently, high motivation to accurately detect deception (e.g., negative mood, high need for cognition) was shown to lead to higher discrimination accuracy between truthful and deceptive messages (e.g., Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Schwarz, 2012). Reinhard (2010), for example, assessed participants’ need for cognition, a well-established individual difference variable that captures individuals’ tendency to think carefully about new information.

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