Abstract
Bargaining, as an instance of sequential games, is a widely studied problem in game theory, experimental and computational economics. We consider the problem of evolving computational agents with optimal (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium) strategies for the Alternating Offers Bargaining Game. Previous work co-evolving agents for this problem has argued that it is not possible to achieve optimal agents at the end of the co-evolutionary process due to the myopic properties of the evolutionary agents. Emphasising the notion of a co-evolutionary solution concept, we show that this conclusion is mis-leading and present a co-evolutionary algorithm that evolves optimal strategies for the bargaining game with one round. We conclude by explaining why, using previous evaluation procedures and strategy representations, the algorithm is not able to converge to optimal strategies for games with more rounds.
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© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Chandra, A., Oliveto, P.S., Yao, X. (2010). Co-evolution of Optimal Agents for the Alternating Offers Bargaining Game. In: Di Chio, C., et al. Applications of Evolutionary Computation. EvoApplications 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6024. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12239-2_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12239-2_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12238-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-12239-2
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