Max Mosley: how I helped broker deal to keep the peace in F1 and prevent breakaway series

FOTA's announcement might excite gullible elements of the media and frighten the commercial rights holders and their banks, but that's as far as it would go.

This is because a breakaway would result in two rival championships. The official FIA Formula One World Championship and a new FOTA championship. The latter would have had all the top teams and drivers except for Williams and Force India, while the former would have the contracts, the name Formula One and the tradition. Formula One Management (i.e. Bernie Ecclestone) could not join the breakaway even if he wanted to, because of his commercial agreements with the FIA.

Knowing that the breakaway would fail completely without circuits and TV coverage, the race promoters and TV companies would have had FOTA and the major manufacturers in a hopeless negotiating position.

And if the commercial problems were not enough, there would have been a major sporting problem. There was confusion as to whether the breakaway series would seek an FIA sanction (which could not be refused if the series were fair and met safety rules) or try to run completely outside the FIA system. If outside, they would have immense difficulties with access to circuits, marshals, medical staff, scrutineers and so on. All are licensed by the FIA.

By running inside the FIA system, all these problems could be avoided but this would have meant the breakaway running under the International Sporting Code, with all the FIA powers and prerogatives to which FOTA was objecting so strongly.

It was very clear that FOTA had not thought through the consequences of either course. However, none of these difficulties would have affected them seriously for some weeks or even months. In the meantime they could pose and bluster and alarm all the major companies involved in F1.

As far as I went, the right thing was to let FOTA go ahead. In all probability, the pressures from the very complex commercial arrangements in modern F1 would quickly bring them to the negotiating table. The only certainty, right from the outset, was that none of the teams would be racing in another championship in 2010. We were likely to lose some manufacturers because of the controversy, but we were probably going to lose them anyway.

It was also very possible that some of the major manufacturer CEOs would intervene and order their teams to stop the nonsense, particularly when they understood that the breakaway was largely ego-driven and that all the FIA was trying to do was reduce costs.

But there was a problem. CVC, the owners of FOM, were under pressure from their banks. There was panic in the City. Foreclosure was being discussed.

My response to this was that it made no difference to the FIA whether we sat the other side of the table from CVC or a group of bankers. We had a contract. If it changed hands through foreclosure, it was no big deal. It was clearly a situation where the FIA could, and should, simply tough it out.

However, there was another factor. Back in 2004, I had decided to step down. Indeed, in July 2004, I resigned. My resignation was to take effect at the next FIA General Assembly in October 2004. This Assembly would elect a new president who would then have a year to establish himself before a full election in 2005.

However, it quickly became apparent that my most probable successor would be someone I knew to be wholly unsuitable. On top of that, I came under pressure from all parts of the FIA to withdraw my resignation. I was told that, before leaving, I must first plan a succession. So I agreed to continue for the final year of the mandate, i.e. until October 2005.

Before my resignation, I was already in discussions with Jean Todt. I thought he would be the ideal person to take over when I stopped. I hoped he would stand for election after he had finished at Ferrari. So I now suggested to him that when I stopped in 2005, he should be a candidate and I would back him. However, shortly afterwards, he was offered the job of Group CEO at Ferrari. He obviously had to take it.

We then agreed that, assuming I were re-elected in 2005, if I wanted to stop before the end of the next four-year (2005-2009) mandate, that was OK by him, but he would definitely be ready to be a candidate in 2009. I decided to hang on, though I really felt it was time for a change – both for my own sake and that of the FIA.

My problem now was that if I took the tough line and faced a winter of conflict with the teams and possibly CVC's bankers, I could not retire from the presidency in October 2009. I was very confident that if I stood again, the FIA would re-elect me but I did not want to stand again. On the other hand, it would not be fair on the FIA or on Jean for me to step down and leave a new president with the battle.

One suggestion was that I go on for another year, finish the conflict with FOTA and deal with any side effects, then resign, allowing Jean to stand.

However, this had a number of disadvantages. It would have prevented Jean picking his own team. It would also have carried a risk of the second election going wrong and someone completely incompetent getting the job.

Some of the names which had been mentioned were positively nightmarish. And finally there was me. I had had enough. I wanted a rest.

This left me with little choice. If I were not prepared to continue, I had to compromise. So immediately before the June 24 World Council I met Luca di Montezemolo (chairman of Ferrari) and Bernie in my office in the FIA headquarters. Nick Craw (the Deputy President for Sport) chaired the Council meeting while we negotiated next door. We came to a deal. In essence, it was the Monaco proposal of May 22.

In return, Luca was prepared to commit the teams to reducing F1 costs to the level of the early 1990s by the end of 2011. This was not ideal, but it was very close to what I thought essential for the survival of F1. Above all, it would allow the new independent teams to be viable. So it was acceptable.

However Bernie and Luca both wanted more than to re-establish the governance and rule stability clauses of the 1998 Concorde Agreement, they wanted a new agreement. This seemed reasonable enough.

We all three rejoined the World Motor Sport Council (WMSC) meeting and the deal was agreed. I also told the Council that I was not going to seek re-election in October. But I did not, at this stage mention the arrangement with Jean Todt. I felt it was for him to announce when he thought the moment was right.

Immediately after the WMSC, Luca, Bernie and I held a small press conference at which we explained what had been decided. We agreed privately not to brief against each other. We then set out for our respective homes. But Luca could not resist. He told an Italian television network he had "toppled the dictator".

I was not pleased so I announced I would now reconsider my decision to stop in October, although I added that in Italy no one took any notice of Luca, least of all his CEO, Sergio Marchionne; he was a mere "bella figura". To his credit, Luca rang me a couple of days later and said let's stop and call it a draw.

FOM, rather unrealistically, asked us to sign the new Concorde Agreement within 24 hours of the World Council. Elements in FOTA were still muttering about a breakaway and perhaps FOM took them seriously. In the event, we ignored this request and spent the whole of July on the Concorde Agreement.

At the end, we finally had something which was acceptable (but only just) to all three parties – the teams, FOM and the FIA. After final approval by the World Motor Sport Council, I signed it on behalf of the FIA on July 31. But it is only for three years. The real negotiations are yet to come.

We were then all able to set off on holiday. The only interruption was the Renault/Briatore saga, which I could well have done without. It is typical of the problems which come out of the blue. Unfortunately they are part of the job.

Where I consider myself very fortunate is that I have not, since 1994, had to confront a real problem in F1 – the death or incapacitating injury of a driver – although, very sadly, we have twice lost a marshal.

These are the only times I deeply care. Problems like the so-called spygate, liegate and crashgate controversies don't really matter. Everyone is still walking around.

It's the awful finality of death or incapacity that gets to you when you are the person ultimately responsible. That's why most of my work with the FIA for the past 16 years has been on road safety. Programmes like Euro NCAP, e-Safety Aware and the work of the FIA Foundation in developing countries do not have the media impact of F1, but in the end they are far more important.

Epilogue

The predicted and predictable withdrawals of manufacturer teams began even sooner than expected. BMW made their announcement on July 29, before the new Concorde had been signed. Then, on Nov 4 came Toyota's departure. This was obviously on its way because of the cost-cutting measures elsewhere in the company, but when I pointed this out in May, the Toyota representative seemed blissfully unaware of the realities.

It is now clear that without the cost cap proposals which were so strongly resisted by FOTA, we would not have new teams in F1 and there would be the real prospect of 12 or 14-car grids. It is quite extraordinary that apparently rational people in FOTA should have been so blind to what was going on and prepared to fight so hard for a doomed business model.

The loss of those manufacturers could very probably have been avoided had FOTA accepted the cost cap as agreed in principle by all the team principals (except Ferrari) at the meeting of Jan 11, 2008 in Paris. It was subsequently worked out in great detail by the teams' chief financial officers at a series of meetings over the following four months. The cost cap will certainly be revived, perhaps disguised as the resource restriction agreement. But it is a sine qua non for a healthy, competitive F1 with real technical freedom, particularly if one or two teams have very wealthy backers.

The loss of BMW and Toyota (as well as Honda) is sad because it was so unnecessary. The only light relief has been the Ferrari suggestion that this was all a plot (by me) to get rid of the manufacturers. To believe this it is necessary to assume that the bosses of BMW and Toyota were lying when they gave the need to save costs as their reason for leaving. You also have to believe they needed to hide the truth for some mysterious reason.

Mistakes? There was perhaps one major error on my part. During the period between the two WMSC decisions in March and April, I should have taken the trouble to visit each of the car company CEOs individually and explain exactly what we were doing and why. Had I done this I think BMW would still be with us and, just possibly, Toyota. It would have been easy to demonstrate that with the cost cap, they could have had the same for far less. But this was never a message their team principals were going to give them.